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CONGRESS AND POST WAR NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY:

A STUDY OF ROLL-CALL VOTING

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

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I hereby recommend that the thesis prepared under my supervision by Neil R. Heighberger

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CONGRESS AND POST WAR NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

In the post world war two period the United States Congress has reasserted its position in formulating national security policy. This is the result of an expanded concept of national security and an increased United States involvement in international affairs. Given this increased role the position of individual Congressmen on national security issues is relevant. The problem investigated is the relationship between a Congressman's position on national security issues and various personal, political and constituency characteristics of the Congressmen.

Guttman scale analysis was applied to roll-call votes in the House of Representatives for the 81st, 83rd and 89th Congresses. A national security domain composed of votes on military issues, military foreign aid, atomic energy and cold war issues was defined on the basis of face validity and more analytic methods. Each representative was given a national security support score based on his voting record in the national security issue domain. This support score became the dependent variable; various personal, political and constituency characteristics were the independent variables. On the basis of the literature;

behavioral and traditional, popular and scholarly, research hypotheses concerning the expected effect of each of the independent variables on national security support were developed. These hypotheses were investigated using tables and two correlation statistics; tau for ordinal level data and lambda for nominal level data.

A major urban-rural factor was present regardless of the urban-rural indicator used. The level of national security support is inversely related to urbanization. The more urban a Congressman the greater the tendency to be a low supporter of national security programs. Political party as such does not appear to be associated with either high or low support. However, members of the party which controls government, both the Presidency and Congress, tend to be low supporters of national security programs while members of the "out" party tend to cluster in the high support category.

No single committee in the House of Representatives deals with national security comprehensively or exclusively, national security issues are handled by several committees. No committee consistently had a majority of its members in the high support category for all three Congresses investigated. Two committees; Education and Labor and Foreign Affairs did have a majority of their members in the low support category for all Congresses

investigated. No region of the country returned a majority of high supporters to all three Congresses; but there is a tendency for this to be the case for the south and midwest.

The impact of the military, in terms of presence or activity in the Congressman's constituency is not large. It was anticipated that Congressmen from areas with a high military impact would be strong supporters of national security programs. There is a slight tendency in this direction but it is far from conclusive. The personal experience of the representative in the armed forces is not consistently associated with support or opposition to national security programs.

The study emphasized the complexity of Congressional voting and the necessity of avoiding simple explanations of the cause of a vote in Congress on national security programs.

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To Sue

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

I

The security of a nation state is the first concern of policy makers; for if the nation state is not secure, other policies may be irrelevant. The national security of the United States in the post World War II period, with both cold and hot wars, has created an environment in which the nation's security arrangements are constantly being scrutinized by persons in and out of government. Traditionally, national security has been considered primarily, if not exclusively, as the charge of the President as Commander in Chief of the armed forces; for national security was essentially equated with military policy. Because it was considered too important to be left to the generals, the nation's security was put in the hands of the President, as Commander in Chief and head of foreign relations,¹ and of his advisors. Congress was not charged with nor did it assume a very large role in the area of national

¹Edward S. Corwin, The President Office and Powers 1787-1957, 4th rev. ed. (New York: New York University Press, 1957), pp. 170-263.

security policy. "The verdict of history, in short, is that the power to determine the substantive content of American foreign policy is divided power, with the lion's share falling usually, though by no means always, to the President."²

The enlarged role of the Congress generally, and the House of Representatives specifically, can be traced from the end of the Second World War.³ Since World War II, Congress "was almost constantly occupied with substantive issues of military policy."⁴ This was a result of a tremendous increase in the level of national defense activity in this period. As William T. R. Fox put it, "Perhaps at no other time since the great cathedral building period in the twelfth and thirteenth century France has so large a proportion of a free society's effort been devoted in peace time to the support of a public enterprise as has the United States in building and maintaining its present

²Ibid., p. 171.

³George B. Galloway, History of the House of Representatives (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1961), p. 207.

⁴Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Practise of Civil Military Relations (Cambridge, Mass.: The Bellnap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 401.

military establishment."⁵ This great national effort that the United States has undertaken has caused a great increase in Congressional involvement.⁶ Congress has become so deeply involved that the relationship between it and the military has become part of the larger problem of civil-military relations.⁷

Congress is emerging as one of the important elements in the development of national security policy. In some cases this involvement is direct, such as limiting the use of United States troops in Cambodia. In other cases such as Congressional action on questions concerning reorganization of the Defense Department, foreign aid, funding programs, internal security and atomic energy, the impact on national security policy may be less direct but it is still important. In showing this new interest and in asserting its force in dealing with military national security issues, Congress is assuming a position that was envisioned for it by the authors of the Constitution; for it was felt that the legislature would be the source of

⁵William T. R. Fox, "Civil-Military Relations Research: The S.S.R.C. Committee and Its Research Survey," World Politics, VI (January, 1954), p. 281.

⁶Huntington, Soldier and the State, p. 400.

⁷Ibid., p. 415.

final regulations of civil military affairs.⁸

Congress rather than the President was given the power to declare war. This was a major departure from the British practice.⁹ The role of the military in the United States was a major concern of the men at the Constitutional Convention. At least one observer maintains the "Constitution of the United States was constructed in fear of a powerful military establishment."¹⁰ At the convention there was opposition to giving the national government power to maintain standing armies. When the decision was made to give the national government this power, Congress was given an important role in the scheme of civil-military relations. A civilian, the President, was made Commander in Chief; but "they (delegates at the Constitutional Convention) insisted also on the civilian control represented by the authority of Congress."¹¹ One of the

⁸ Walter Millis, Harvy C. Mansfield and Harold Stein, Arms and the State (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1958), p. 347.

⁹ Huntington, Soldier and the State, p. 178.

¹⁰C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 176.

¹¹Research and Policy Committee of the Committee for Economic Development, "Civilian Control or Militarism?" U. S. News and World Report, December 23, 1949, p. 38.

basic ideas of this new scheme was that armies would be raised on the authority of Congress.¹²

Six clauses of article 1, section 8 of the United States Constitution deal with the role of Congress in its relations with the military. These clauses are as follows:

To declare War, grant letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water;

To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use should be for a longer term than two years;

To provide and maintain a Navy;

To make Rules for the Government and Regulations of the land and naval Forces;

To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of Union, suppress Insurrection and repel Invasions;

To provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.

In addition to these specific grants, Section 8 declares that "Congress shall... provide for the common defense." "Congress is the final citadel of civilian control."¹³

¹²Arnold M. Rose, The Power Structure (New York: University Press, 1967), p. 134.

¹³Millis, Arms and the State, p. 335.

In the area of foreign affairs, the Constitution gives the Congress the important power to regulate foreign commerce and declare war. "The House of Representatives received a share in the treaty power through the commerce clause and through its power to originate appropriations bills needed to impliment a treaty."¹⁴ "The national government's exclusive control over foreign relations gives Congress plenary legislative power in this domain."¹⁵

The question was not closed with the final draft of the Constitution, the Constitution still had to be ratified by the states. The role of Congress and the role of the military was still being debated. The early Federalist papers deal in some depth with the defense requirements of the new nation, especially numbers 2-9, 11, 24 and 26-29. While most of the topics discussed in the Federalist do not focus on the same questions that are discussed in the 1970's some of the underlying issues are the same. One of the main questions debated at the time was the right of the national government to keep a standing army. In Hamilton's Federalist No. 26 he deals with

¹⁴Galloway, History of the House of Representatives, p. 192.

¹⁵Frederic A. Ogg and P. Orman Ray, Introduction to American Government, 8th ed. (New York: D. Appleton - Century Company, 1945), p. 652.

this problem at length and cites the legislature, the people's branch, as one of the main checks on the dangers of a standing army. "They (the legislature) are not at liberty to vest in the executive department funds for the support of an army."¹⁶ Elsewhere (No. 24) Hamilton argues "From a close examination it will appear that restraints upon the discretion of the legislature in respect to military establishments would be improper to impose ..."¹⁷ (emphasis added)

The legislature in the United States does have a Constitutional role to play in the direction of the military. The result of the vesting of Congress with this power has been to "lodge the military establishment squarely in the middle of the built-in rivalries between the Congress and the White House for control of the executive branch on one hand and the legislative program on the other."¹⁸ The White House has won in most cases, especially in times of crisis and war. As Commander in Chief the President traditionally has had a dominant position in this

¹⁶Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay, The Federalist Papers with introduction by Clinton Rossiter (New York: The New American Library, 1961), p. 171.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 160.

¹⁸Harvey C. Mansfield, "Civil-Military Relations in the United States," Current History, (April, 1960), p. 230.

field vis-a-vis Congress. In times of war the need for unified swift action gives the President a critical advantage; in times of peace Congress has been all too happy to let the President take care of these matters.¹⁹

The period since World War II has been like no other in our history; we have been at peace in name only. This has been the era of the "cold war" and the United States has assumed a role in international affairs that is un-equaled in any period in our history. It would now be impossible for the United States to eliminate or reduce the standing army to three or four thousand men. We now think in terms of how many million men we need in the armed forces and how many billion dollars it will cost to maintain sufficient force levels. This is not a mere increase in the quantity of armed forces; it has created a whole new force in peacetime American society. The military and their conscious and unconscious supporters have become a major force in our society that was not present before the assumption of the new position in the world by the United States. This force is new in the United States, but it was recognized and debated at the time of the adoption of the Constitution.

¹⁹Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1961), Passim.

"The violent destruction of life and property incident to war, the continual effort and alarm attendant on a state of continual danger, will compel nations the most attached to liberty to resort for repose and security to institutions which have a tendency to destroy their civil and political rights. To be more safe, they at length become willing to run the risk of being less free. The institutions chiefly alluded to are standing armies and the correspondent appendages of military establishments."²⁰

While the threat was recognized, it was rejected by Hamilton and others at the time. This rejection was probably the proper course to follow given the small standing armies and military establishments that were contemplated at the time and those that existed during most of our national history.

II

While Hamilton and others rejected the contention that standing armies and the appendages of military establishments would be a threat to our system of government; others in more recent times have not agreed with this conclusion. The post World War II debate has not centered on the need for a standing army or any conspiracy on the part of the munitions manufacturers; the debate has tended to center around a more difficult to dis-

²⁰Hamilton, The Federalist Papers, No. 8, p. 67.

tinguish approach to problem solving, method of operation and coincidence of interest. One of the first persons to discuss the problem was Harold Lasswell in his "Garrison State" thesis.²¹ In January 1948 a committee headed by Albert Einstein issued one of the first post war warnings about the growth of the military: "America cannot remain democratic if the present trend toward military control of our institutions continues ... Not only are military men moving into key positions of government but the army and Navy are extending their influence into science, education and industry. Huge military appropriations ... enable the army to mold public (opinion) ... subtle influences are also at work to make the people react favorably to military propaganda."²²

The most highly developed treatments of the issue are to be found in the books by Rose²³ and Mills.²⁴ While the analysis by scholars and academicians may have been penetrating, for the most part the audience was small; students, and a small

²¹Harold D. Lasswell, "The Garrison State", American Journal of Sociology, VIX (1939), pp. 455-468.

²²"Militarization," Editorial Research Reports, May 12, 1948, p. 301.

²³Rose, The Power Structure.

²⁴Mills, The Power Elite.

group of the population that read the books or magazines of opinion. The issue was just not a major point of public debate. This was probably caused by several factors but the most important one was undoubtedly that it was considered practically unpatriotic to address oneself to this issue of the power of the military.²⁵ In this environment, few opinion leaders spoke to the issue. In January 1961, President Eisenhower made his famous farewell address. In part he stated:

"We annually spend on military security alone more than the net income of all the United States corporations.

Now this conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence - economic, political, even spiritual - is felt in every city, every state house, every office of the Federal Government. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources, and livelihood are involved, so is the very structure of our society.

In the councils of Government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought by the military industrial complex. The potential for this disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist."²⁶

²⁵John Kenneth Galbraith, How to Control the Military (New York: The New American Library Inc., 1969), p. 49.

²⁶Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Liberty is at Stake" in The Defense Sector and the American Economy by Jacob Javits, Charles J. Hitch and Arthur F. Burns (New York: New York University Press, 1968), p. 97.

The issue of the power of the military industrial complex suddenly had been given the stamp of legitimacy by our departing military hero President. Since this time, discussion about the general issue of the power and influence of the military in society in general and national security affairs in particular has been couched in the rhetoric of the military industrial complex. Probably one of the main reasons for this is an attempt on the part of critics to retain the legitimacy given the issue by the Eisenhower speech by using his terms.

In recent years discussion of the impact of the military industrial complex on our society has been one of the major issues of public debate. One of the real problems in this debate is that the participants cannot agree on just what they are talking about or how it has come to have the great amount of influence many of the critics maintain it has. Very few of the critics contend that there is a conspiracy or a plot on the part of the military and their appendages. Popular and academic discussion does not clarify the point. As one popular critic stated: "But the coinage of Presidential action is often minted long before it is issued by the White House."²⁷ This type of statement does not clarify much.

²⁷Charles W. Bartley and Frank Wright, "American Militarism Part II, The Defense Establishment", Look, August 26, 1969, p. 19.

C. Wright Mills develops his ideas with more sophistication. Mills maintains that the military elite is general enough to influence vital decisions in its area. This is not to say that they make every important decision or that they win in all cases when there is conflict among the various decision makers. The military does have the capacity to shape the alternatives that are presented to the deciders.²⁸ This position may be contrasted to a much more general approach that American society does not contain a ruling military industrial complex, but it is more accurate to say that American society is a military industrial complex.²⁹ Whatever it is, many of the critics would probably agree with the thesis, if not the words, of a Michigan State economist who has maintained that the military industrial complex is a "Frankenstein threatening to control the contract state which brought it into being."³⁰ In an attempt to provide some clarity, the Twentieth Century Fund has announced that it would initiate its new direction, the study of the major institu-

²⁸Mills, The Power Elite, Chapter 9.

²⁹Mark Pilisuk and Thomas Hayden, "Is There a Military Industrial Complex Which Prevents Peace?: Consensus and Countervailing Power in Pluralistic Systems," The Journal of Social Issues, XXL (July, 1965), p. 88.

³⁰Jack Raymond, "Growing Threat of our Military Industrial Complex," Harvard Business Review (May-June, 1968), p. 54.

tions dominating our society, with a study of the military establishments impact on American Society.

The impact and role of the military industrial complex has not been of interest to just scholars and journalists. Traditionally, this issue was not a good issue for a politician to raise; it was not a policy issue that interested many voters and before the Eisenhower speech any politician who approached it in critical terms had little to gain and much to lose. Increasingly now the popularity of the defense issue is being recognized; it has become an area of interest to voters and it is open to critical analysis by candidates.³¹ Shortly after President Kennedy took office he issued a warning about the impact of the defense budget on our national psychology, strategy and economy.³² More recently some U. S. Senators have warned that the military industrial complex is "the most serious internal threat facing the United States."³³ There are

³¹Bernard K. Gordon, "The Military Budget: Congressional Phase," Journal of Politics, XXIII (November, 1961), p. 698.

³²Waldeneman D. Nielson, "Huge Hidden Impact of the Pentagon," The New York Times Magazine, June 25, 1961, p. 9.

³³"McGovern Decries Military Influence," The New York Times, December 9, 1969, p. 41.

three major threats to the successful survival of American Democracy. "The first is the military industrial complex ... which is evidenced in very high quarters by our strong support of military regimes in various parts of the world and by the enormous impact of the military and their industrial partners over public opinion and on the members of Congress and the Senate."³⁴

Now there is concern about the impact of the military industrial complex on the American system of government just as there was concern during the early days of our history about the impact of "standing armies and the correspondent appendages of military establishments." What is not clear is what is included in this "complex" or "establishment" and how it affects the Congressional aspect of policy making. What is clear is that today it includes more than simply an officer in uniform advising a civilian policy maker.

III

Congress, in its new national security policy role, has become an important part of this process. The exact

³⁴"Senator Clark Hits F.B.I. and C.I.A. as danger to U. S.", The New York Times, December 19, 1966, p. 22.

role of the Congress in the entire area of national security policy is not agreed upon. Harold Stein sees Congress' main influence as a result of the tendency of high level civilians and officers to limit their decisions to what they think Congress would or would not permit.³⁵ In the area of foreign policy, Congress has a vast amount of power to determine the bounds within which the President must work.³⁶ Generally both Carroll and Robinson³⁷ attribute to Congress a limited role in the foreign policy process; but it is clear that both authors feel that Congress does have a role to play in setting limits in which decision must fall. In a 1957 work, Huntington maintains that "In the ten years following World War II ... Congress was almost constantly occupied with major substantive issues of military policy."³⁸ This increase in importance was attributed to cold war related defense activities which enhanced

³⁵Harold Stein, ed., American Civil Military Decisions A Book of Case Studies (Birmingham, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1963), p. 16.

³⁶Corwin, p. 192.

³⁷Helbert N. Carroll, The House of Representatives and Foreign Affairs (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1958) and James A. Robinson, Congress and Foreign Policy Making, A Study in Legislative Influence and Initiative, revised ed. (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1957).

³⁸Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 401.

Congress' role in the area of policy and administration.³⁹ In addition to the increasing importance of the Defense effort there was an important legal change in the National Security Act of 1949. This change allowed a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to present Congress "On his own initiative after first informing the Secretary of Defense, any recommendations relating to the Department of Defense that he may deem proper."⁴⁰ This, in effect, included Congress in innermost controversies in the Department of Defense by giving the heads of the services legal access to Congress.

Congress exercises its control in many ways, through statutes, appropriations, investigations and controls over the organization of the defense establishment. Congress has usually been very interested in questions of defense organization; Congress deliberately kept the services separate during the period of reorganizing the nation's military establishment to keep the Secretary of Defense from gaining too much power.⁴¹ "By the National

³⁹Ibid., p. 400.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 415.

⁴¹Raymond H. Dawson, "Congressional Innovation and Intervention in Defense Policy: Legislative Authorization of Weapons Systems," The American Political Science Review, LVI, (March, 1962), p. 55.

Security Act of 1947 it (Congress) has prescribed the process of policy formation and coordination ..."⁴² The power of the purse is one of the most important tools Congress has; the military budget is probably the most important continuing contact between the military and Congress. As General Omar Bradley stated "The military policy of the United States is shaped by the Congress not by the Armed Forces ... because ... Congress controls the appropriations which in the final analysis ... controls military policy."⁴³ Congress not only controls in a negative way it also lobbies for given programs. Congress has become a lobbyist; groups in Congress can and do conduct long range pressure campaigns to get the administration to act on a given policy in a given way.⁴⁴ One of the most important forms of Congressional lobby is the appropriation of unwanted funds.

Congress does have an important role in the formation of national security policy. There is little consensus about what is or is not included in national security policy, but it does include an interdependence of foreign

⁴²George B. Galloway, The Legislative Process in Congress (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1953), p. 55.

⁴³Gordon, "The Military Budget," p. 709.

⁴⁴Huntington, The Common Defense, p. 135.

and domestic policies as well as national defense policies.⁴⁵ The next section will deal with this question and deal specifically with the methodology used to investigate the problem: the relationship between a Congressman's position on national security issues and various personal, political and constituency characteristics.

⁴⁵See Galloway, The Legislative Process, p. 167, for a discussion of the interdependence of these various issues and the effect on Congress.

CHAPTER II

METHODOLOGY

I

The study of the legislative aspect of government has been a principal concern of Political Scientists for quite some time. There are various approaches to the study of the legislative aspect of government and legislators; these include tracing the path a bill takes through the legislative mills;¹ discussion of the legislative process by present or past legislators, legislative aids or by Political Scientists and journalists on the basis of interviews with insiders² the study of one aspect of the legislative process³ and the study of roll-call

¹For example see Stephen K. Bailey, Congress Makes a Law (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950) or Daniel M. Berman, A Bill Becomes a Law (New York: MacMillan, 1962).

²For example see Donald Matthews, U. S. Senators and Their Worlds (Chapelle Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1960) or Joseph S. Clark, The Senate Establishment (New York: Hill and Wing, 1963).

³For example see James A. Robinson, The House Rules Committee (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1963) or Robert A. Dahl, Congress and Foreign Policy (New York: W. W. Norton Co., 1950).

voting in the legislature.⁴

This study will use the last technique mentioned, the analysis of roll-call votes. This method of studying legislative behavior has several advantages over the other methods mentioned. The vote cast on a roll-call is not ambiguous; it is there in black and white. There can be no disagreement whether it is a yes or no vote. This is not the same when we are dealing with interview material, the interview method has major difficulties with this problem. What was said in a given interview is often in question and when the parties involved agree on what was said they may disagree on what was meant. There are great semantic difficulties with the interview method, there is little semantic problem in "yes" and "no" roll-call votes.

The use of roll-call votes has another great advantage. It is an official record of a legislator's stand on an issue. What takes place in the executive sessions of committees, in cloak rooms, the impact of pressure groups and personal contacts are all important; the problem is that we can have no direct way of knowing for sure what

⁴For example see David B. Truman, The Congressional Party (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1959) or Duncan MacRae, Jr., Dimensions of Congressional Voting (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958).

really took place. The problem of interviewing to ascertain what took place has been discussed. There are also problems encountered in direct recall by the participants. The individuals involved, because they are human, have selective perception and retention; in addition they only see the situation from one point of view. This is not to say that the only action of a legislator that is important is his roll-call vote; these other actions are very important but there are very substantial problems faced by the researchers in ascertaining the role and importance of these other actions.

The vote of the individual is the main way he can officially affect decisions made by the legislature. These other influences mean little if they do not affect the vote of the legislator. "The roll-call record is therefore an accurate summation of the effectiveness of the pressure of various groups on each congressman."⁵ Not only do roll-call votes act as an accurate summation of the pressures that operate on Congressmen; "In the final

⁵Julius Turner, Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress, The Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science Series LXIX, No. 1 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1951), p. 19.

analysis (they are) the only indisputable record of each legislator's actions."⁶

Roll call votes have another important characteristic; that is they are comparable. They are the only actions of a legislator that may be compared with actions of other legislators.⁷ Statements and actions of individual legislators may be illustrative but it is difficult, if not impossible, to make a valid comparison between actions of various legislators. Since roll-call votes are public, official and unambiguous this type of comparison may be made.

Finally the use of roll-call analysis provides a large number of instances that can be analyzed within the same frame of reference. In any one Congress, many roll-call votes are taken, these provide the raw data, individual votes, that are the basis of this type of study. While case studies can provide valuable insight, they suffer from the fact that they are concerned with one case or at best a few related cases. This raises serious doubts about their generality and/or replicability. This in turn casts serious doubts on the value of case studies when it comes

⁶Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Vol. XXI, 1965
(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Services, Inc., 1966), p. 1082.

⁷Ibid., p. 1082.

to making generalizations. Even if numerous case studies are accumulated they are invariably done by different authors, working on different problems or covering different time spans. While in some instances these diversities have value; in many instances, they lead to nonparallel methodology and dissimilar if not different conclusions.

Roll-call analysis does not inherently suffer from this disadvantage because one researcher, using the same methodology, with the same point of view may deal with many cases. This is evident when one remembers that, assuming all members vote, on ten votes in the House of Representatives there will be 4,350 votes cast. Since individual votes are the raw data used in roll-call analysis there is a wealth of material to study.

The fact that roll-call votes provide such "hard" data is not an unmixed blessing. Legislators must vote yes or no; there is no room for "buts" or "under some circumstances." For this reason looking at one vote could be very misleading because of the absence of more subtle shades of opinion. This is true even though, as has been pointed out, the vote is a good indication of the sum of the pressures operating on a legislator. When we look at many votes the problem is not as grave as it would first appear. "Although examining a large number of these public choices (roll-call votes) in series and in combination

may miss some subtleties of meaning it can be a reliable procedure for identifying patterns of intent--general tendencies of behavior that may lead to a clearer understanding of the legislative aspect of government."⁸

At this point it should be emphasized that roll-call analysis is only a tool that can and should be used in the study of the legislative process. Only when the results of various types of studies are carefully integrated will a fuller understanding of the legislative process be possible.

Roll-call analysis can be used to discover and analyze patterns of legislative voting. While it is a way to measure voting behavior in the legislature "the techniques of roll-call analysis do not explain to the researcher patterns he may discern in voting."⁹ The techniques of roll-call analysis are tools that measure behavior but do not give us direct information about the factors that caused the behavior. This does not prevent valid inferences from being made. Inference is a "vital element" in the systematic investigation of a problem.¹⁰

⁸Truman, The Congressional Party, p. 13.

⁹Lee F. Anderson, Meredith W. Watts, Jr., and Allen R. Wilcox, Legislative Roll-Call Analysis (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966), p. 10.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 11.

What is critical is that inference be recognized as such and not as a direct result of roll-call analysis. To use an analogy: we can use a ruler to measure how tall two plants have grown in a given period of time. This does not tell us what made one plant taller than the other. But if we know the taller of the two plants was watered regularly and that this is the difference between the two plants we may legitimately infer that the watering was the reason the one plant grew taller than the other. In the same way if we know a group of legislators vote together on a given issue and the only thing that distinguishes them from their colleagues that did not vote in the same way is a given constituency characteristic, then we may legitimately infer that this constituency characteristic may be the reason for the group voting together.

II

No attempt will be made to deal with all types of roll-call analysis, that is beyond the scope of this project.¹¹ The method of roll call analysis used in this

¹¹For a discussion of a great variety of approaches to roll-call analysis see the following works. Duncan MacRae, Issues and Parties in Legislative Voting (New York: Harper and Row, 1970); Stuart Rice, Quantitative Methods in Politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1928); Anderson, Legislative Roll Call Analysis; Truman, The Congressional Party.

project, Guttman or cumulative scale analysis will be discussed, first in general terms, then specifically as it was used in this project.

Guttman scale analysis was developed by Louis Guttman while working in the War Department's attitude measurement project during World War II. The Guttman scale technique was designed to measure attitudes toward various groups or situations. "The concept of attitude does not refer to any specific act or response of an individual but is an abstraction from a large number of related acts or responses."¹² An individual's attitude has also been described as "an (enduring) syndrome of response consistency with regard to (a set of) social objects."¹³ From these comments it is clear that an attitude is not an easy thing to measure. An attitude is a hypothetical construct which can't be observed directly. Attitude can only be inferred from observed consistencies in behavior.¹⁴ Guttman did this with paper and pencil tests that were designed

¹²Bert F. Green, "Attitude Measurement," in Handbook of Social Psychology, ed. by Gardner Lindzey (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison Wesley, 1954, p. 335.

¹³Ibid., p. 336.

¹⁴Leroy N. Rieselbach, Congressional Isolationist Behavior, 1939-1958 (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation Yale University, 1963), p. 144.

to reveal attitudes toward combat, officers and army life in general.

The underlying hypothesis of Guttman scaling is that "the items being tested are ordered such that ideally, persons who answer a given question favorably all have higher ranks on the scale than persons who answer a question unfavorably. Then from a person's rank or score we know exactly which items he endorsed."¹⁵ The items are thus ordered in such a way that when a person answers positively to one item he will answer positively to all items that are lower on the scale. The following example will illustrate this characteristic of scales. The questions which are used in constructing this scale have to do with the weight of a person. The questions are:

1. Do you weigh 150 pounds or more?
2. Do you weigh 200 pounds or more?
3. Do you weigh 250 pounds or more?

If a person answered yes to question two then he would also answer yes to question one. In comparing individuals this property of scale can be displayed as it is in figure 2-A.

¹⁵Samuel A. Stauffer, et al., Measurement and Prediction (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1950), p. 9.

Figure 2-A

<u>Individual</u>	<u>Item One</u>	<u>Item Two</u>	<u>Item Three</u>
A	Yes	Yes	Yes
B	Yes	Yes	No
C	Yes	No	No
D	No	No	No

With this type of display it is apparent that the more "yes's" an individual has the more of the quality being measured he has, in this case weight. The four answer patterns displayed in Figure 2-A are the only four possible patterns with this set of questions. This meets one of Guttman's operational definitions of a scale. A set of items of common content is a scale if "a person with a higher rank than another person is just as high or higher on every item than the other person."¹⁶ We see that individual A has more weight than B and so on down the list. A second criteria in the operational definition of scale has to do with reproducibility of answers. If a series of items is a scale then "each person's responses will be reproducible from his rank alone."¹⁷ Because of this fact it is advantageous to create categories rather than display the answers they may give. Individuals A, B, C and D become categories A, B, C and D. When this is

¹⁶Ibid., p. 62.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 62.

done all one had to do is say what category a person falls into and certain facts about his weight are known.

When these two operational criteria are met then we have a scale; when a scale does exist we can be confident we are measuring one variable. Thus scalability is a test of unidimensionality. Scale analysis does not judge content, it assumes that a universe of content has been defined; scale analysis merely tests whether or not the area is representable by a single dimension.¹⁸

The scales discussed up to this point have been "perfect" scales, in the real world "perfect" scales do not often exist, unidimensionality is an analytical convenience.¹⁹ For this reason Guttman created the coefficient of reproducibility, known as C.R. "The amount by which scale deviates from the ideal scale is measured by a coefficient of reproducibility. This is simply a measure of the relative degree with which the obtained multivariate distribution corresponds to the expected multivariate distribution of a perfect scale."²⁰ The formula for computing CR is $1 - \text{number of errors} / \text{number of item responses}$. What is an acceptable CR is up to the individual research-

¹⁸Ibid., p. 85.

¹⁹George M. Belknap, "A Method for Analyzing Legislative Behavior," Midwest Journal of Political Science, II (November, 1958), p. 383.

²⁰Stauffer, Measurement and Prediction, p. 77.

er. Not only is this aspect of scaling involved with mathematics, in the background of all Guttman scaling there is some rather complex mathematics. But "no knowledge of the mathematics is required in actually analyzing data."²¹

At this point we will turn to the application of Guttman scaling to the study of legislatures. The pioneering work in this area was done by Duncan MacRae, Jr. and much of this discussion is based directly on his pioneering work.²² In applying Guttman's technique to the study of legislatures, roll-call votes are used to discover an underlying attitude rather than asking a series of questions as was done by Guttman and in the example. This creates some problems because roll votes are not constructed with the purpose of revealing the attitude of the legislators toward any given subject. However, as MacRae and others have found, votes do scale on many policy areas. The most obvious type of votes that scale are those involving the level of funding for various programs. In addition to this type of vote other major areas of policy such as labor-management relations, economic policy etc. scale,

²¹Ibid., p. 61

²²MacRae, Dimensions of Congressional Voting. See especially appendix A for a discussion of how Guttman scaling technique was adapted to be used in the study of legislatures.

those areas "which involve similar cumulative divisions of attitude along what appears to be a series of dimensions."²³

The result of Guttman scaling is the simultaneous ordering of roll-calls and legislators. The roll-calls constitute the cutting points between ordered categories and legislators are distinguished by their placement in categories. Figure 2-B will illustrate how this would appear.

Figure 2-B

<u>Votes</u>	<u>Marginal Frequency of "Pro" Vote in Percentages</u>
1	.95
2	.93
3	.86
4	.85
5	.43
6	.15

From this table we could create a seven position continuum and place legislators on this continuum based on their voting record. When this is done we can make inferences about how the individual voted and/or would vote

²³Douglas Price, "Are Southern Democrats Different?" in Politics and Social Life by Nelson Polsby, Robert Dentler and Paul A. Smith (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1963), p. 663.

on various issues and how legislators compared to other legislators in their voting record. These inferences are based on the properties and criteria of scales discussed earlier.

In constructing scales, the researcher determines for each roll-call under consideration what type of vote, "yes" or "no", is a vote representing a positive vote concerning the area being researched. If a researcher is interested in internationalism a no vote on a bill to eliminate foreign aid would be considered a positive vote in favor of internationalism. In terms of representation it would be shown as a "+", and an anti-internationalism vote would be shown as a "-" on a chart of voting behavior showing internationalist voting patterns.

Since we cannot construct roll-call votes we must select those appropriate to the study. First the researcher must identify the attitude he is studying. Rieselbach studied an attitude he described as internationalism, the roll-call votes he selected for his study were those involving foreign aid and foreign trade.²⁴ At this stage of the process the judgment of the researcher is very important; later when the votes selected are tested for scal-

²⁴Leroy N. Rieselbach, The Roots of Isolationism (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1966).

ability the unidimensional aspect of the Guttman scale will insure that one or at the worst a few very closely related dimensions are involved. The fact that a set of roll-calls scale does not say a thing about the content of the roll-calls or what is being measured. The researcher must determine what is being measured.


A second step in selecting roll-call votes to be included is to select those that will dichotomize the membership into two groups; a "pro" and "con" on any given issue.²⁵ For this reason unanimous and near unanimous votes are not included. What is meant by near unanimous is up to the researcher. MacRae did not include unanimous votes, pure party votes or votes showing fewer than five departures from either pattern.²⁶

Referring back to Figure 2-B we see that votes 1 and 2 have frequencies of 95 percent and 93 percent; and votes 4 and 5 have frequencies of 45 percent and 42 percent. These votes are similar enough that they could be combined to form one item each. When this is done we have a four item scale, which makes analysis simpler. The four

²⁵Charles D. Farriss, "A Method of Determining Ideological Groupings in Congress," The Journal of Politics, XX (May 1958), p. 320.

²⁶MacRae, Dimensions of Congressional Voting, p. 317.

items in this new scale are item one which is made up of votes 1 and 2, item two which is composed of vote 3, item three which is composed of votes 4 and 5 and item four comprised of vote 6. These four items create the cutting points of a five position cumulative scale with the "easiest" position being scale position 1 and the hardest position being scale position 5. These would appear visually as follows:



In practice, legislative votes do not scale perfectly, one encounters non-scale or deviant votes. Ten percent error is the figure commonly used as the greatest acceptable error but this is not a hard and fast rule and the decisions on how much error to permit in the scales should be handled in the context of the particular scales that the researcher is working with.²⁷ After the limit is established there is still a problem. The logic of Guttman scale analysis assumes that any non-scale pattern is an error from a perfect type. When a non-scale pattern occurs it is assigned a scale type from which it is assumed that

²⁷Belknap, "A Method for Analyzing Legislative Behavior," p. 390.

the pattern is a deviate form; it is assigned to the scale type that would involve minimum error. For example if a legislator had a voting record of + + - + + on a series of votes on one issue and the perfect scale types are as follows:

A + + + + +

B + + + + -

he would be placed in category A because it would mean there was only one error, that one being on vote three. If he were placed in category B it would mean he had two errors, one on vote three and one on vote five. This does not solve all problems. In some instances the minimum error response will not give a clear cut answer. In these cases the error response pattern is assigned to the perfect scale type having the greatest frequency. The advantage of this system over other assigned systems in this situation is that it makes the ambiguous assignment to the perfect scale type from which it is most probably deviate.²⁸ The following is an example of a scatogram of Foreign aid votes for the Wisconsin delegation for the 85th Congress.²⁹

²⁸Andrew F. Henry, "A Method of Classifying Non-Scale Response Patterns in a Guttman Scale," Public Opinion Quarterly, XVI (Summer 1952), p. 105.

²⁹Rieselbach, The Roots of Isolationism, p. 206.

Congressmen	Items (votes)									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
O'Konski	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Smith	+	A	+	+	+	A	A	+	A	+
Van Pelt	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Withrow	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Laird	+	-+	+	+	+	+	+	-	-	(+)
Byrnes	+	+	(-)	+	-	-	-	-	-	-
Johnson	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Jablocki	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Reuss	-	-	-	-	-	(+)	-	-	-	-
Tewes	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

+ - isolationist vote
 - - internationalist vote
 A - absent or not voting
 () - error

CR - 1 - 3/96
 - 1 - .03
 - .97

The ten congressmen fell into six of the possible scale types ranging from strong isolationists to strong internationalists. The more internationalist a representative, the more positive votes he will have. Guttman scales furnish a ranking of legislators, not a measure of the distance between them.

III

What was to be included in the operational definition of national security for the project was an initial decision that had to be made. What subject matter is relevant to national security policy and what is not relevant

is not readily clear. Many programs which are only indirectly related to national security are at times linked to the nation's security in an effort to capitalize on a large base of support that exists for any program that is essential to the nations security; highway construction programs would probably fall into this category. On the other hand most observers tend to include more than just purely military items or programs when national security policy is discussed.

A survey of writing on this subject does little to clarify the issue. In the first place there are no universally accepted terms in this area; commentators that refrain from using the emotion laden term "Military Industrial Complex" tend to discuss similar questions under the headings of civil-military relations, defense, militarism, and national security.³⁰ In addition to using different terms to label the phenomenon in question authors tend to include different areas of governmental activity. A few examples of various elements that have been included are, aero-space contractors,³¹ military foreign aid,³²

³⁰Lewis J. Edinger, "Military Leaders and Foreign Policy-Making," American Political Science Review, LVII (June 1963).

³¹New York Times, "McGovern Decries Military Influence," p. 41.

³²Stein, American Civil-Military Decisions, p. 17.

foreign policy,³³ unification of the military, atomic energy, space programs,³⁴ the Central Intelligence Agency³⁵ and the internal security programs of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.³⁶ Regardless of the name used, the aspects investigated or the elements included, most of the critics would probably agree that what they are discussing includes a "coincidence of interests and a coordination of aims among economic and political as well as military actors."³⁷

For the purpose of this study the national security domain includes strictly military matters such as pay scales, reorganization and appropriations, internal security programs, military foreign aid, atomic energy and cold war issues. The national security domain as outlined by these issue areas is consistent with the enlarged post-World War II concept of national security but does not include all areas of policy that could minimally be related

³³Nielson, "Huge, Hidden Impact of the Pentagon," p. 34.

³⁴James L. McConanghy, Jr., "Congressmen and the Pentagon," Fortune, April, 1958, p. 156.

³⁵"Douglas Assails Pentagon Power," The New York Times, Western Edition, December 15, 1962, p. 1.

³⁶"Senator Clark Hits F.B.I. and C.I.A. as Danger to U. S.," p. 22.

³⁷Mills, The Power Elite, p. 224.

to the nation's security. This study is limited to the House of Representatives in the post World War II period. This period was chosen for study because it is in this period that the expanded definition of national security is relevant and national security programs were actively debated. The size of the House of Representatives makes it more susceptible to roll-call analysis because it provides much more data (individual's votes) to analyze than does the Senate.

The first step was to survey the national security related activity for all post World War II Congresses. Several works were consulted in this survey; Congress and the Nation,³⁸ Congressional Quarterly Almanac, and New York Times. The Congresses which were active in the issue domain were then searched for relevant roll-call votes. When there was some question as to the issue at hand for a given vote, the debates as reported in the Congressional Record were read in addition to consulting the three previously mentioned sources. In addition to having roll-call votes in the issue domain, to be acceptable the votes in any one Congress had to meet certain criteria. (1) The votes could not be unanimous, at least ten percent of those pre-

³⁸Congressional Quarterly Service Congress and the Nation 1945-64, a review of government and politics in the postwar years (Washington: Congressional Quarterly Service 1965).

sent and voting had to be opposed to the majority. (2) The votes could not be party votes, neither party could be unanimous and there had to at least be ten percent of one party voting against the majority of that party. (3) At least one half of the House membership had to be present and voting. (4) The marginals of the votes in the issue domain had to be distributed in such a way as to create meaningful positions. In practice this last criteria meant that some of the issues had to fail and some of them had to pass, and the range had to be at least twenty percent. The relevant votes were selected for each Congress on the basis of face validity, it was then determined what constituted a "pro" vote on each issue. This decision was also made on the basis of content of the issue involved in the vote; a "pro" vote was defined as a vote to bolster or protect a national security program or some element of a program.

On the basis of this procedure, three Congresses were chosen for further analysis, these were the 81st, 83rd, and 89th Congresses. This is not to say that other Congresses in the post World War II period did not deal with national security issues. The criteria that were set were rather demanding. For example, MacRae excludes unanimous votes, party votes and those votes showing fewer than

five departures from either pattern.³⁹ Rieselbach uses scales which show very little real difference in support levels.⁴⁰ The high standards used in this study probably excluded some interesting Congresses but it was felt that this loss was more than compensated for by making more meaningful analysis of these Congresses that were included possible. At this point we have what MacRae calls a "preliminary universe of content"⁴¹ for the three Congresses being studied. To check these preliminary universes of content, a Q matrix of association for these votes was constructed.⁴² A level of .70 was set as the minimum acceptable Q to include a vote in the issue domain.⁴³

Scales were constructed using the votes that had been included in the national security issue domain. The votes were the cutting points for the scale. Individuals were given a scale score. At this stage not only were votes cast included, but pairs and announced positions as

³⁹MacRae, Dimensions of Congressional Voting, p. 317.

⁴⁰Rieselbach, The Roots of Isolationism, pp. 211-218.

⁴¹MacRae, Issues and Parties, p. 24.

⁴²Duncan MacRae, Jr., "A Method of Identifying Issues and Factions from Legislative Votes," American Political Science Review, LIX (December, 1965), pp. 909-926 and Anderson, Legislative roll-call Analysis, pp. 100-104 discuss this problem and procedure.

reported by Congressional Quarterly were included. The reason for this is two-fold. First it greatly increased the number of Congressmen that can be included in the analysis. Second it is consistent with the logic of the method of identifying supporters of various levels of national security programs. By utilizing this additional information more meaningful analysis was possible. Representatives who were not members of the House when all votes were taken and members that had no position recorded on two or more votes were excluded. After these exclusions were made, 417 members of the 81st Congress, 425 members of the 83rd Congress and 423 members of the 89th Congress were included in the analysis. If a congressman had more than one error or one error and a vote with no indication of position he was not classified.

When there was a question about which category in which to place a Congressman the minimum error criteria was used. If this did not create a clear solution as to which category to place a legislator in, he was assigned the type with the greatest frequency of pure types. The coefficient of reproducibility for the three scales are as follows: 81st Congress .94, 83rd Congress .91 and 89th Congress .97. At this point an issue domain has been de-

⁴³See appendix II for a list of included votes.

efined that meets the criteria of a scale in technical terms as well as on the basis of face validity. By definition, we are dealing with one issue area, or at most, closely-related issue areas.

With the basic scales established and the Representatives given a scale score, the foundations of the analysis are laid. The analysis of the basis of support for national security programs will comprise latter chapters. All statistics used in this analysis were chosen because they are appropriate to the data at hand. As each statistic is used for the first time it will be noted and discussed. The analysis of the basis of support for national security issues will be discussed in terms of various personal, political and constituency characteristics associated with various Congressmen. The sources of the data on these various characteristics will be discussed next.

IV

The basic roll-call data for all Congresses considered was provided by the Inter-University Consortium for

Political Research.⁴⁴ The following sources of data were consulted for data relevant to the 89th Congress. Information on party, age, education, sex, religion, religious activities, military background, occupation, committee assignment, committee rank and seniority was obtained from the Congressional Directory, 89th Congress 2nd session. Since the biographical information in this source is provided by the Congressman, the quantity and quality of information varied greatly. When information was omitted or vague, the Congressional Quarterly Almanac for the 89th Congress was consulted. The size of the Congressman's birthplace was obtained by consulting the World Almanac. The regional classification of the Inter University Consortium for Political Research was used for determining region. Coastal significance was determined by consulting the district maps in the Congressional Directory, 89th Congress 2nd session. The states rank in defense, procurement, pay and personnel was from page 1132 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, June 11, 1965. The number of defense plants and military bases in the district was obtained from pages 1168-1178 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, May 24, 1968. The demographic characteristics of

⁴⁴The Inter University for Political Research bears no responsibility for either the analyses or interpretations of the partially proofed data which they provided for the study. I would like to thank the University of Cincinnati Computer center for their assistance with this data.

Congressional districts; percent owner occupied dwelling units, percent negro, percent urban, percent rural non farm (also referred to in the text as suburban), percent rural, median years of school completed, median age of district, percent of district that had completed four years of college or more, percent of total male labor force that were members of the armed forces, and percent of total employed persons with white-collar occupations were obtained from the Congressional District Data Book for the 88th Congress with supplements for the 89th Congress.

The following sources were consulted for the data relevant to the 83rd Congress. The information on party, age, education, sex, religion, religious activities, military background, committee assignments, committee rank and seniority was obtained from the Congressional Directory, 83rd Congress 2nd session. Since the biographical data in this source is provided by the Congressman it varied greatly in quality and quantity. When information was omitted or vague, the Congressional Quarterly Almanac for the 83rd Congress was consulted. The size of the Congressman's birthplace was obtained from the World Almanac for the middle of the decade in which the Congressman was born. The size of the Congressman's present home town was obtained from the 1955 World Almanac. The regional classi-

fication of the Inter University Consortium for Political Research was used to determine region. The coastal significance of the districts was obtained by consulting the district maps in the Congressional Directory for the 83rd Congress 2nd session. The states rank in defense personnel was obtained from page 111 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, January 23, 1953. The states rank in procurement was obtained from page 1430 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, December 17, 1954. The demographic characteristics of the district; percent non-white, percent urban, percent rural non-farm (also referred to in the text as suburban) and percent rural farm and percent owner occupied dwelling units were obtained from the County and City Date Book, 1956, Appendix 6. Selected Data for Congressional Districts.

The following sources were consulted for data relevant to the 81st Congress. The information on party, age, education, sex, religion, religious activities, military background, committee assignments, committee rank and seniority were obtained from the Congressional Directory, 81st Congress 2nd session. Since the biographical information in this source is provided by the individual Congressman it varied greatly in terms of quantity and quality. When data was missing or vague, the Congressional Quarterly Almanac for the 81st Congress was consulted. The

size of the Congressman's birthplace was obtained by consulting the World Almanac for the middle of the decade in which the Congressman was born. The size of the Congressman's present home town was obtained by consulting the 1948 World Almanac. The regional classification of states employed by the Inter University Consortium for Political Research was used in determining region. Coastal significance was obtained by consulting district maps in the Congressional Directory, 81st Congress 2nd session. Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, December 17, 1954, page 1430 was the source of the states ranks in procurement.⁴⁵

V

The sources of support for national security policy will be investigated by relating various support levels of Congressmen to various personal, political and constituency characteristics associated with the Representatives. By investigating the influence of these various factors, the impact of some aspects of the alleged military-industrial complex as well as other factors on the legislative phase of national security issues will be illustrated. While there has been little direct research on the

⁴⁵See appendix one for more specific information on coding the data.

sources of support in the area of national security, there has been a great deal of research in other policy areas. This research has proved a valuable source of research hypotheses. While research in other policy areas can provide guidance and some direction, it must be remembered that, in part, the hypotheses were drawn from other substantive areas and other time frames. Of necessity some of the hypotheses were developed with very little guidance from other research and in a few cases the "serendipity" approach was used. The research hypotheses will be presented in three general categories: those related to the personal characteristics of the Congressman, those related to the political characteristics of the Congressman and those related to the characteristics of the Congressman's district. The literature cited in relation to many hypotheses will guide the reader to material that deals with the subject and served as a basis in developing the hypothesis. When no work is cited the hypotheses must be considered much more explanatory and tentative.

A. Research hypothesis relating to the personal characteristics of Congressmen.

A-1. Congressmen with a high level of religious identification will tend to provide less support for national security programs than will Congressmen with a low level of religious identification.⁴⁶

⁴⁶Leroy N. Rieselbach, "The Demography of the Congressional Vote in Foreign Aid, 1939-58," American Political Science Review, LVIII (September, 1964), passim.

A-2. Congressmen with a high degree of military identification will tend to provide more support for national security programs than will Congressmen with a low level of military identification.⁴⁷

A-3. The Congressman's previous occupation will have little relationship to his support for national security programs.

A-4. Congressmen from rural background will have a greater tendency to support national security programs than will Congressmen from urban backgrounds.⁴⁸

A-5. Congressmen who now reside in small towns will have a greater tendency to support national security programs than Congressmen who live in the cities.⁴⁹

A-6. Congressmen with a low level of formal education will tend to provide more support for national security programs than do Congressmen with a high level of formal education.

A-7. Older Congressmen will tend to provide more support for national security policy than do younger Congressmen.

B. Research hypotheses relating to political characteristics of Congressmen.

B-1. Democrats will tend to provide a higher level of support for national security programs than will Republicans.⁵⁰

⁴⁷David B. Truman, The Governmental Process (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), pp. 262-288, and Huntington, The Common Defense, p. 389.

⁴⁸Murry C. Havens, "Metropolitan Areas and Congress: Foreign Policy and National Security," Journal of Politics, XXVI (1964), p.765 and Turner, Party and Constituency, p. 75.

⁴⁹Ibid.

⁵⁰Huntington, The Common Defense, p. 252.

B-2. Members of the party that controls the Presidency will tend to provide a higher level of support for national security programs than will members of the "out" party.⁵¹

B-3. Congressmen who serve on committees that deal with national security matters will tend to provide a higher level of support for national security programs than will Congressmen who do not serve on relevant committees.⁵²

B-4. Congressmen with more seniority will tend to provide a higher level of support for national security programs than will Congressmen with less seniority.

C. Research hypotheses concerning the Congressman's constituency.

C-1. Southern Congressmen will tend to provide a higher level of support than will Congressmen from other sections of the country.⁵³

C-2. Congressmen with many defense related industries in their district will tend to provide a higher level of support for national security programs than will Congressmen with few defense related industries in their district.⁵⁴

C-3. Congressmen with many military bases in their districts will tend to provide a higher level of support for national security programs

⁵¹Turner, Party and Constituency, p. 23, and Riesbach, Congressional Isolationist Behavior, 1939-58, pp. 27-33.

⁵²Richard F. Fenno, Jr., The Power of the Purse: Appropriations Politics in Congress (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1966), p. 181; John M. Swamley, Jr., "The Growing Power of the Military," The Progressive, Jan. 1959, p. 25; Paul Blanshard, "Park Barrels in the Pentagon," The Nation, June 4, 1949, p. 633; Huntington, The Common Defense, p. 122.

⁵³Charles O. Lerche, Jr., "Southern Congressmen and the 'New' Isolationism," Political Science Quarterly, (September, 1960), p. 333 and Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 211.

⁵⁴Pilisk, "Is There a Military-Industrial Complex?", pp. 85-86, Huntington, The Common Defense, p. 389.

than will Congressmen with few military bases in their district.⁵⁵

C-4. Congressmen with a high percentage of the male work force in their district on active military duty will tend to provide a higher level of support for national security programs than will Congressmen with a low percentage of the male work force on active military duty.

C-5. Congressmen from coastal areas will tend to provide a higher level of support for national security programs than will Congressmen from inland areas.⁵⁶

C-6. Congressmen from states that rank high in defense related procurement, payroll, and jobs will tend to provide a higher level of support than do Congressmen from states that rank low in these areas.⁵⁷

C-7. Congressmen representing urban districts will tend to provide lower levels of support than Congressmen representing mid districts.⁵⁸

C-8. Congressmen that represent districts that are low in social-economic status characteristics will tend to provide a higher level of support than Congressmen that represent districts that are high in social-economic status characteristics.

These research hypotheses will be investigated in the following chapters.

⁵⁵Ibid.

⁵⁶Huntington, The Common Defense, p. 257.

⁵⁷Truman, The Congressional Party, p. 249-269, passim.

⁵⁸Havens, "Metropolitan Areas and Congress," pp. 765-67; Froman, Congressmen and Their Constituencies, p. 11; and Turner, Party and Constituency, p. 75.

CHAPTER III

PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS

I

The Congressman takes to Congress his own personal background and approach to problems. The Congressman's personal orientation to legislative issues should be affected by his personal characteristics. The effect of selected personal characteristics of Congressmen on their National Security support level will be discussed at this time. The effect of religion and intensity of religious orientation will be treated first.

The impact of religion in somewhat different issue areas has been shown in other studies. Rieselbach has demonstrated that in the area of foreign aid that "of the personal characteristics of the Congressmen considered here only religious affiliation seems to have been associated with foreign aid voting alignments."¹ Accepting the position that generally religion is an important factor in influencing Congressmen's voting, the more involved an individual

¹Rieselbach, "The Demography of the Congressional Vote," p. 580.

is with organized religion, the greater the impact religion should have on that person's Congressional voting record. The direction of this impact is somewhat more difficult to surmise. On one hand generally churches tend to support ideals such as peace, brotherhood of man and the necessity for human understanding. On the other hand there also appears to be a tendency for churches to be supporters of wars that are being waged or contemplated by their secular government. These two apparently contradictory tendencies could create cross pressures for individual Congressmen, the net result being no discernable impact on the aggregate distribution of voting patterns between those Congressmen with low and high levels of religious identification. Keeping this possibility in mind the following research hypothesis concerning intensity of religious identification will be investigated.

A-1 Congressmen with a high level of religious identification will tend to provide less support for National Security Programs than will Congressmen with a low level of religious identification.

To investigate this hypothesis we will look at the relationship between the Congressmen's position on the National Security Scale and membership characteristic will serve as the index of religious identification. The data on religion for members of the earlier Congresses is incomplete. When no religious data was provided in the official

biography of Congressmen for the 81st and 83rd Congress this was taken as an indication of low religious identification. For all three Congresses only a statement of affiliation was taken as a low level of identification. This inconsistency in the data should be kept in mind when referring to Table 3.1.

TABLE 3.1

National Security Support	Intensity of Religious Preference					
	81st Cong.		83rd Cong.		89th Cong.	
	Low	High ^a	Low	High	Low	High
Low ^c	51% ^b	66	71	83	46	35
High	42	22	27	17	43	47
Total Cases	241	18	187	18	199	73

^aHigh member of state or national religious organization, low is no information or just preference stated.

^bAll data are in column percentages, they may not total to 100 due to rounding and non-inclusion of middle support level.

^cLow support level is made up of the two lowest support levels, high support level is made up of the two highest support levels.


Upon examination of the table, the general religious factor does appear to have the expected impact for the first two congresses investigated. The impact of the

religious identification factor in the 89th Congress appears to be minimal; in fact the slight tendency that does exist for the 89th Congress is not in the direction indicated by the hypothesis. This may be a result of the cross pressure previously discussed becoming especially strong during the 89th Congress as a result of a war in Asia. This is logical except for the fact that the 81st and especially 83rd were also, in part, war Congresses, which had a war in Asia to contend with. The basic information in Table 3.1 can be rearranged in such a way to presumably explain the apparent contradictory case of the 89th Congress. Figure 3-A graphically presents the difference in the intensity of religious identification makes for the three Congresses studied.

When the difference is examined over time it appears that possibly the 89th Congress is not a deviate case; the relationship that existed in the 89th Congress may have been part of a trend that had existed before, but was not as apparent earlier. On the basis of this information the hypothesis must be rejected. The hypothesis held true for the first two Congresses investigated but not for the third Congress under consideration. As has been shown it is plausible to maintain that the impact of the intensity of religious preference is decreasing as an influence on congressional voting on National Security issues. The

Figure 3-A

Religious Impact over Time



^aThe solid line is for congressmen with a high level of national security support. The broken line is for congressmen with a low level of national security support.

^bA "+" sign indicates a relationship in the direction projected by the research hypothesis; a "-" sign represents a relationship opposite of that projected by the research hypothesis.

work by Rieselbach that concluded that religious factor was important dealt with the period of 1939-1958 and it may be

that the trend toward less influence of this factor was not discernable until after the termination of his work.

A second facet of the relationship between religion and support of national security programs is the impact of membership in specific churches. Table 3.2 presents the basic relationship between membership in specific religious groupings; Catholic and Protestant, and support for national security programs.

TABLE 3.2

National Security Support	RELIGION AND NATIONAL SECURITY SUPPORT					
	81st Cong.		83rd Cong.		89th Cong.	
	Pro.	Cath	Pro	Cath	Pro	Cath
Low ^b	53% ^a	89	70	55	24	61
High	35	6	29	36	63	18
Total Cases	99	18	132	11	284	89

^aAll data are presented in column percentages they may not total to 100 due to rounding and non-inclusion of middle support level.

^bLow support level is the two lowest support levels, high support level is the two highest support levels.

In this case the pattern is somewhat mixed when all three congresses are considered. The clearest relationship exists for the 89th Congress with the Protestants being much stronger supporters than are the Catholics. This

general relationship does not hold true when the other two Congresses are considered. In the 81st Congress both Catholic and Protestant identifiers provide relatively low levels of support with the Catholic identifiers providing more low support and the least high. In the 83rd Congress, again both Catholic and Protestants provide a rather low level of support, but in this instance Catholics generally provided a higher level of support than did the Protestants. A word of warning must be restated for the 81st and 83rd Congresses: the small number of Catholics provide a rather weak base for any analysis. Because of the small number of Catholics in the 81st and 83rd Congresses, meaningful control could not be employed, this problem was not present in regard to the 89th Congress and controls were used. For the 89th Congress the same basic relationship persisted between religious preference and national security level when controls were imposed with one exception. The control for political party altered the basic relationship. The results of this control are reported in Table 3.2.a.

When we control for party the simple relationship between religious preference and national security support disappears. The original strong Protestant and weak Catholic support is apparently a function of party preference. The Catholic Democrats have a low level of support while

TABLE 3.2.a
RELIGION AND NATIONAL SECURITY SUPPORT
CONTROLLED FOR PARTY, 89TH CONGRESS

National Security Support	Democrat		Republican	
	Pro.	Cath.	Pro.	Cath.
Low ^b	40% ^a	71	5	7
High	41	6	94	78
<u>Total Cases</u>	<u>166</u>	<u>75</u>	<u>118</u>	<u>14</u>

^aAll data are given in column percentages and may not total 100 due to rounding and omission of middle support level.

^bLow support level is made up of the two lowest support levels, the high category is made up of the two highest support levels.

the Catholic Republicans have a high level of support. Given the fact that 75 of 89 original Catholics were Democrats this explains half of the original relationship. When the Protestants are considered, we find that the Republican Protestants still have a higher support level than do the Republican Catholics. Protestant Democrats also register a change in support level as compared to the basic table 3.2 but the change was not as great as the Republican Catholics registered when the party control was applied. The Democratic Protestant change was comparable to the Republican Catholic Change, but in the opposite

direction. That is the Republican Protestants tended to have higher support scores while the Democratic Protestants tended to have lower support scores. While the percentage change in high support score was roughly the same for Republican and Democratic Protestants one still gets the general impression from examining the party control table that the Republican Party had a greater impact than did the Democratic party. This can be explained, in part by the ceiling effect.² The 31 percent increase registered by the Republican Protestants was 84 percent of the possible increase, the 22 percent decrease in high support registered by the Democratic Protestants was 35 percent of the possible decrease. The Democratic Protestants tend to be evenly divided while in the other three categories show either high or low support levels. For all Congresses it appears that religion has a greater impact on the Democrats than the Republicans.

II

A second major personal trait that Congressmen bring to Congress with them is their previous military exper-

²Hans Zeisel, Say it With Figures, 5 ed. rev. (New York: Evanston and London: Harper and Row Publishers, 1968), p. 10.

ience. This experience could conceivably influence in different ways, to be either supporters or opponents of an enlarged national security effort. Those Congressmen who were favorably impressed by their military service could tend to become strong supporters of an enlarged national security system. Those Congressmen who had no military service or had a less favorable experience in the military could have a tendency to oppose an enlarged national security system.

There appears to be a general assumption that Congressmen who are highly identified with the military in their personal lives are strong supporters of national security related issues in Congress. Huntington maintains that often Congressmen with personal affiliations with a service are dependable supporters in Congress.³ The reserve officers association and veterans association are also considered to be part of the same constituency.⁴ This position concerning service and membership in constituency groups is logical and is also consistent with Truman's position that the formal or informal members of a group

³ Huntington, The Common Defense, p. 388; for the same point see also Jack Raymond, "Growing Threat of our Military-Industrial Complex," Harvard Business Review (May-June, 1968), p. 61.

⁴ Nielson, "Huge, Hidden Impact of the Pentagon," p. 34 and Hanson Baldwin, "The Military Move In," Harpers (December, 1947), p. 487.

improve that group's access and influence on decision making bodies.⁵ On the basis of this theoretical position and popular assumption, the following will be the research hypothesis concerning the Congressman's previous military experience:

A-2 Congressmen with a high level of military identification will tend to provide more support for national security programs than will Congressmen with a low level of military identification.

Military service was used as the indicator of military identification. Five levels of identification were established.⁶ The basic relationship that emerged is displayed in Table 3.3.

An examination of Table 3.3 does not show the relationship between the two indicators that we could expect on the basis of the research hypothesis. The correlations⁷ between level of national security support and military

⁵ Truman, The Governmental Process, pp. 262-288.

⁶ The five levels of service used are as follows:
1 - no service
2 - enlisted men
3 - officer
4 - member of veteran's organization
5 - active reserve

⁷ The correlation statistic reported in Kendall's Tau with corrections forties. See Hubert M. Blalock, Jr. Social Statistics (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1960), pp. 319-324.

TABLE 3.3

MILITARY IDENTIFICATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY SUPPORT

National Security Support	81st Congress				
	<u>Level of Military Identification</u>				
	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>
Low ^b	56 ^a	56	41	55	37
High	39	37	23	36	56
Total Cases	172	54	27	77	32

National Security Support	83rd Congress				
	<u>Level of Military Identification</u>				
	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>
Low	68	67	68	68	89
High	31	34	33	28	11
Total Cases	129	45	37	79	44

National Security Support	89th Congress				
	<u>Level of Military Identification</u>				
	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>
Low	36	43	52	33	27
High	51	42	37	51	62
Total Cases	108	74	35	92	78

^aAll data are given in column percentages and may not total 100 due to rounding omission of middle support level.

^bLow support is the two lowest support levels high support is the two highest support levels.

identification are as follows: 81st Congress .0422, 83rd Congress-.0725, and for the 83rd Congress-.0702.

These correlations⁸ are quite low as would be expected from examining the distributions in the Table. Generally, we must expect low correlations for two reasons. First, the statistic being used Tau-C is a low scoring statistic.⁹ Second, as Flinn points out, a correlation of .4 is "remarkably good" because so many factors are involved in legislative voting."¹⁰ It must also be pointed out that Flinn was not referring to a coefficient that is known as a low scoring statistic. Measures of statistical significance are not included because we are not dealing with samples and for this reason statistical significance is not a very meaningful concept.

The only important change in the relationship between national security support and military identification appears when region of the country is introduced as a control. In this case a relatively small change does take place in the anticipated direction when only the south and border sections of the country are considered.¹¹ The im-

⁸I would like to thank the Xavier University Computer Center, and especially Mr. Tom Gush for the assistance provided with the statistical analysis.

⁹ Blalock, Social Statistics, p. 323.

¹⁰Thomas A. Flinn, "Party Responsibility in the States Some Causal Factors," American Political Science Review, LVLL (March, 1964), p. 64.

¹¹See appendix I for states included in this category.

pact was greatest for the 89th Congress where correlation for this section was a +.1883 as compared with a +.0702 for the nation as a whole. The correlation in the other two Congresses also moved in the expected direction but the change was not as great as occurred for the 89th Congress. The difference can be illustrated in tabular form as is done in Table 3.4 for the 89th Congress.

TABLE 3.4

MILITARY IDENTIFICATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY
SUPPORT CONTROLLED FOR REGION

National Security Support	High Military Identification ^a	
	South and Border	United States
Low ^c	10% ^b	13
High	<u>33</u>	<u>24</u>
Total Cases	115	400

^aActive Reserve or Veterans Organization

^bData are in column percentages, and do not total 100 due to rounding and omissions of middle support level.

^cLow support in the two lowest support levels, high support in the two highest support levels.

In examining Table 3.4, a third of the highly identified Congressmen from South or border states are

high supporters as compared to only slightly less than a quarter of the Congressmen for the United States as a whole for the same category. For the South and border states ~~only~~ 10 percent of the highly identified are low supporters while 13 percent of the highly identified are low supporters for the United States as a whole. While this shows the impact of region, this influence is perhaps better by looking at the difference in percentages. When the nation as a whole is considered, the difference in high and low supporters is 11 percent, when the South and border region the difference is 23 percent, more than twice the difference for the nation as a whole.

For the Congresses studied, the hypothesis concerning the impact of military identification, must be rejected as it applies to roll-call voting on national security matters. The basic relationships were slight and one was even in the wrong direction. Only in one Congress, the 89th, did any correlation even approach an important level and the correlation of +.1883 for South and border Congressmen must be considered as low.¹²

¹²In referring to correlations the following classification system will be used:

± .0000 ± .0999 Slight	± .1000 ± .1999 Low
± .2000 ± .2999 Moderate	± .3000 ± .3999 High
± .4000 ± 1.0 Very high	

III

A constant theme that runs through much of the literature on Congress has to do with the influence of Constituency; especially the urban-rural nature of a Congressman's constituency. Turner reports that "Metropolitan and rural pressures affected voting behavior of Congressmen in a substantial number of roll calls."¹³ Havens found that in a study of House of Representatives voting, urbanization of the district had a statistically significant impact at the .01 level on exactly half of the votes he studied. On nine of the 10 votes he studied, urbanization was the only independent variable that was clearly identified with Congressional voting.¹⁴ The urban-rural nature of the constituency has been shown to be important; but one urban rural factor that has been slighted has been the Congressman's personal background. This omission would appear to be fairly serious given the importance of an individual's early experiences in his later life.¹⁵

In dealing with the impact of early urban-rural socialization the size of the Congressman's place of birth

¹³Turner, Party and Constituency, p. 75.

¹⁴Havens, "Metropolitan Areas and Congress," p. 766.

¹⁵See Richard E. Dawson and Kenneth Prewitt, Political Socialization (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1969).

or where he spent his childhood will be used as the indicator of the early urban-rural environment. The work cited, particularly that done by Havens, leads to the following research hypothesis:

A-3 Congressmen from more rural backgrounds will tend to provide more support for national security programs than will Congressmen from more urban backgrounds.

The basic relationship between size of birthplace and National Security Support is presented in Table 3.5, the indicators have been dichotomized in this table as elsewhere to facilitate interpretation, the correlations will be reported later in the text.

The first thing that strikes one about Table 3.5 is the small number of Congressmen from cities of 200,000 or more persons. In all three Congresses a greater percentage of small town Congressmen are high supporters than are city Congressmen; in the 81st and the 89th Congresses the spread is quite large but in the 83rd the rural and urban categories are much closer in support levels. When the low support level is considered we find a greater percentage of urban background Congressmen in this category than rural background Congressmen. Again the difference is considerable for the 81st and 89th Congress but for the 83rd the urban-rural background does not seem to make much difference. In both the high and low support categories,

TABLE 3.5
 SIZE OF BIRTHPLACE AND NATIONAL
 SECURITY SUPPORT

National Security Support	81st Cong.		83rd Cong.		89th Cong.	
	Rural ^a	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban
Low ^b	55% ^c	78	70	72	22	62
High	53	14	29	23	60	23
Total Cases	283	59	272	43	261	84

^aRural is a birthplace of less than 50,000 persons, urban is a birthplace of 200,000 or more persons.

^bLow support is the first two levels of support high support is the two highest levels of support.

^cAll data are in column percent and may not total to 100 due to rounding and omission of middle level support.

the hypothesis provides a correct indication of which category of Congressmen should have the largest percentage for each level of support. The correlations between size of birthplace and National Security Support level are also all in the predicted direction, they are for the 81st, 83rd and 89th Congress, respectively, $-.1603$, $-.0363$ and $-.2872$. As an examination of Table 3.5 would lead us to expect there is a slight correlation for the 83rd, a low correlation for the 81st and a moderate correlation for the 89th

Congress.¹⁶ The hypothesis concerning the relationship between size of birthplace and National Security Support has been confirmed by the data for all three Congresses and will be accepted.

Turner reports that the urban-rural division had more impact on Democrats than Republicans.¹⁷ When we control size of birthplace for party we find that for the 89th Congress the size of birthplace does seem to have a greater impact on Democrats than Republicans. The Democratic correlation is $-.2598$ while the Republican correlation is $-.1799$ which is what would be expected on the basis of Turner's findings; the Republican correlation shows more change than does the Democratic correlation. When the 81st and 83rd Congresses are considered, we find deviation from the expected pattern. For the 81st and 83rd the Republicans are the most affected. From this evidence it would appear that we cannot say that Democrats are definitely the most affected by a rural background.

Other controls tended to change the magnitude of the correlation but they all tend to be negative.

¹⁶The section of Table 3.5 for the 89th Congress provides a good example of the low scoring nature of Tau-C. A visual inspection of the data would lead one to a relationship stronger than $-.2872$. When Yules Q was calculated for this data we get a value of $-.76$, the Phi is $.412$ and Gamma is $-.37$.

¹⁷See Turner, Party and Constituency, p. 75.

that is in the direction predicted by the hypothesis. There is one general exception to this is the general pattern; for the South and border states for the 83rd Congress there was a slight positive correlation. In analysis of the 89th Congress the educational level of the Congressman's district was controlled. This control created an interesting change in the level of the correlations. For those Congressmen from districts with a high educational level¹⁸ the correlation of $-.2743$ was very close to the basic overall correlations of $-.2872$. For those Congressmen from districts with a low educational level the correlation was $-.3763$, the first high correlation that has been discovered. It would appear that lack of education in the Congressman's district does affect their position on national security issues while a high level of education has little impact.

IV

The size of the Congressman's present home town is another index of the urban-rural dimension that is basically a personal characteristic. (The urban-rural nature of the constituency will be discussed later.) The research

¹⁸The educational level of the district was considered Low if the Median years of school completed was less than 9.5; it was considered High if it was 12 years or more.

hypothesis for this personal characteristic is as follows:

A-4 Congressmen who reside in more rural areas will have a greater tendency to support National Security Programs than will Congressmen who live in more urban areas.

Table 3.6 presents the basic information concerning the size of the Congressman's home town and his National Security Support level.

TABLE 3.6

SIZE OF HOME TOWN AND NATIONAL SECURITY SUPPORT

National Security Support	81st Cong.		83rd Cong.		89th Cong.	
	Rural ^a	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban
Low ^b	44 ^c	77	72	63	22	57
High	49	14	27	31	63	28
Total Cases	236	78	231	51	210	106

^aRural is a town of less than 50,000 persons; urban is a city of more than 200,000 persons.

^bLow support level is the two lowest support levels; high support level is the two highest support levels.

^cThe data in the table are in column percentages, it may not total to 100 due to rounding and omission of middle support level.

Comparing Tables 3.5 and 3.6, as one might suspect they are very similar. The similarity of the influence is probably clearer when the basic correlation between Nation-

al Security Support and size of birthplace and home town are presented in Figure 3-B.

Figure 3.B

Correlations between National Security Support and Size of Birthplace and Present Home Town

<u>Congress</u>	<u>Size of Birthplace</u>	<u>Size of Present Home Town</u>
89th	-.2872	-.2591
83rd	-.0363	-.0293
81st	-.1603	-.2175

The basic influence of the size of birthplace and size of present home town is very similar. For two of the three Congresses, the 89th and 83rd, the size of birthplace seems to be slightly more important; while for the 81st Congress the size of the Congressman's home town is more important. When controls are imposed, the results are somewhat different than they were for size of birthplace. When we look at the parties, we find that the urban-rural nature of the Congressman's present home town had the greatest effect on the Democrats in all three Congresses. This finding is consistent with the position taken by Turner as to the impact of urban-rural influences on Democrats and Republicans. Other controls tend to change the magnitude of the correlation but not greatly and not in direction.

This is also true when the south and border areas are considered; this was not the case when this control was imposed with regard to size of birthplace. The control for the educational level of the district created somewhat different results than it did when size of birthplace was the main variable under consideration. The correlation between size of present home town and National Security Support for Congressmen from districts with a low educational level was $-.3943$; for Congressmen from districts with high educational level the correlation was $-.1063$. The basic uncontrolled correlation was $-.2591$. In this case the correlation increased for low education districts as it did when size of birthplace was considered, the correlation decreased for Congressmen from high education districts which did not happen when size of birthplace was being considered.

These two factors, size of birthplace and size of present home town, appear to affect National Security Support levels in much the same way. The most interesting exception to this generalization is the impact of the educational level of the district. It is unclear why the educational control influences the correlation in only one direction when the size of birthplace is the basic variable being studied and it influences the correlations in two

directions when size of present home town is the basic variable.

V

One of the most important factors affecting any person's life is his educational experience; the relationship between years of formal education (the index of education used) and the Congressman's National Security Support level will be investigated next. The exploratory research hypothesis for this education variable is as follows:

A-5 Congressmen with a low level of formal education will tend to provide more support for National Security programs than will Congressmen with a high level of formal education.

In this exploratory investigation, the relationship between the Congressman's educational level and his support for National Security programs, we generally find a slight relationship. The correlations for the 81st, 83rd and 89th Congresses, respectively are $-.0391$, $-.1071$ and $-.0826$. It should be noted that while one of these coefficients falls in the low category and the other two are slight, they are all in the direction indicated by the hypothesis. When the party control is imposed the magnitude of the change is not great. For the 81st Congress the Democratic correlation is $-.0928$ and the Republican corre-

lation is -1086. For the 83rd Congress, the Democratic correlation is +0206 while the Republican correlation is -.1183; in the 89th Congress the Democratic correlation is -1437 and the Republican correlation is -.0397. The 83rd Congress is the only place we find a correlation in the "wrong" direction, that is in the direction not indicated by the exploratory hypothesis. The greatest correlation in the "right" direction is for the Democrats in the 89th Congress but even this correlation falls in the low category.

The exploratory hypothesis does tend to provide an indication of the direction of the basic correlation of the relationship in the Congresses studied. When controls were applied, both reported and unreported, the relationship was negative, except in the one case reported. The impact of education on the Congressman's national security support level is slight.

VI

The chronological age of a Congressman could have an impact on his National Security support level. In the absence of any firm guidance from other sources, the exploratory hypothesis will be as follows:

A-6 Older Congressmen will tend to provide more support for National Security programs than will younger Congressmen.

We find, upon investigation that in only one Congress, the 81st, is this hypothesis sustained at a low level. In the 83rd Congress there is a slight relationship in the "wrong" direction, while in the 89th Congress we find a slight correlation in the predicted direction. Controls illuminate two relationships that are interesting and to some extent expected. The controls for party and region and presented in Figure 3-C.

Figure 3-C

Correlation between National Security Support
and Age, Controlled for Party and Region

<u>Congress</u>	<u>Dem.</u>	<u>G.O.P.</u>	<u>South</u>
81st	-0120	.0994	-.1027
83rd	-1572	.1117	-.0951
89th	-.1454	.0017	-.0279

Examination of Figure 3-C nicely shows the affect of the controls for party. While the basic relationship for the three Congresses as a whole were not all in the same direction, the party control sorts out this mixed relationship. In all three Congresses the Republican's correlation were in the "right" direction while the corre-

lations for the Democrats were in the "wrong" direction. The age factor effects Democrats and Republicans differently with the older Republicans providing more support as would be expected on the basis of the hypothesis. This does not hold true however for the Democrats whose older members displayed a tendency to provide less support than do the younger members of the party. It would also appear that age tends to have a greater impact on the Democrats in the sense that the negative Democratic correlations are stronger than the positive Republican correlations for two of the three Congresses considered.

When the south as a separate region of the country is considered, this also tends to sort out the mixed findings that exist for the uncontrolled relationship. As would be expected, given the heavily Democratic nature of the south, southern Congressmen tend to have negative correlations as do the Democrats. It will also be noticed that the negative correlations of southerners get progressively weaker and in the last two Congresses are weaker than the Democratic correlation. On the basis of the analysis, we must reject the hypothesis as it stands. The fact that age has a different affect on Democrats and Republicans demonstrates the complexity of the relationship.

VII

The third and final exploratory hypothesis dealing with the personal characteristics of Congressmen deals with the Congressman's occupation before they entered Congress. The following is the exploratory hypothesis concerning previous occupation.

A-7 The Congressman's previous occupation will have little relationship with his support for National Security programs.

Table 3.7 which deals with previous occupation and National Security Support levels has the support levels dicotomized into high and low categories. The low category includes the two lowest levels of support while the high category includes the two highest levels of support.

The first striking fact about Table 3.7 is the distribution of occupation, only three categories, law, medium level business and Government service are frequently listed for all Congresses. The small number of representatives of other occupations makes analysis difficult. We find that in only three occupational groups; government service, medium level business and educational and clergy, did less than half of the Congressmen have high support levels in all three Congresses. The percentage of Congressmen whose background was primarily in government service and provided high support ranged from 33-46, for middle level business the range is 17-49 percent and for education

TABLE 3.7

PREVIOUS OCCUPATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY

Nat. Sec. Support	81st Cong.		83rd Cong.		89th Cong.	
	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High
Previous Occupation						
Skilled Labor	(100 ^a) ^b	0	75	(25)	(25)	(50)
Farmer	(25)	(59)	74	(27)	(8)	(83)
Government service	49	44	65	33	43	46
Med. Level business	57	34	81	17	32	49
Ed., Clergy, etc.	53	(36)	61	(39)	(45)	(35)
Law	55	36	70	29	31	54
Medical Doctor	57	(29)	(100)	0	(33)	(67)

^aAll data are in row percentages for each Congress and may not total to 100 due to rounding and omission of middle support level.

^bData in () are based on 10 or fewer cases.

and clergy the range was 35-39 percent. The tight range for this last category was the most striking. No occupational groups had more than half in the high category for all three Congresses. When we look at the low support columns no occupational group had more than half its members above or below the .50 percent mark for all three Congresses. See Figure 3-D for an alternative presentation of this data.


Figure 3-D

CONSISTENCY OF OCCUPATIONAL GROUP SUPPORT

a. High Support

Percentage of
Occupational
Group with
High Level
of Support

100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10



- ++++ Law
- Medium Level Business
- Education, Clergy, other service profession
- Government service
- .-.- Farmer

Figure 3-D

CONSISTENCY OF OCCUPATIONAL GROUP SUPPORT

b. Low Support

Percentage of
Occupational
Group with
Low Level
of Support

100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10

81st

83rd

89th

Congress

- ++++ Law
- Medium Level Business
- Education, Clergy, other service profession
- Government service
- - - Farmer

When the difference within occupational categories, for any Congress, between the percentage with high support scores and low support scores is considered, we find the Education, Clergy category the most consistent. The range of difference for this category is 12 percent; from 10 percent difference in the 89th Congress to 22 percent difference in the 83rd Congress. The range of difference was less than 10 percent for three other occupational grouping; Law, medium level business and Government service for two of the three Congresses, the 83rd being the exception.

Returning to the original hypothesis concerning occupation, it can be accepted with qualification. The qualification concerns Education, Clergy and other service professions. Congressmen with this background tend not to provide a high level of support for National Security programs. This category of Congressmen are also the most consistent in that their lack of support stayed at relatively the same level over all Congresses considered and the difference between high and low support score in the three Congresses is also relatively stable. The relative subtlety and consistence displayed by this group of Congressmen may be a result, in part, of a more homogenous occupational category. That is, there may be more similarity in professional education and orientation in this category than is true in the other occupational categories.

The Congressmen that did have a background in service oriented professions do show a consistency that other occupational groups do not show. The hypothesis can be accepted with the exception that service oriented professionals tend to consistently provide low level support.

VIII

The various personal factors in a Congressman's life have been shown to have an impact on his National Security Policy support level. Perhaps the most surprising result was the lack of apparent relationship between the Congressman's military experience and his support level. Several other personal characteristics especially religion, education and age were shown to have little consistent impact on National Security support. Occupation, with one striking exception, showed no consistent relationship with National Security Support. Finally the size of the Congressman's birthplace and the size of his present home town both proved to be important personal factors that were related to the Congressman's National Security position. In both instances, size of birthplace and size of home town but particularly when size of home town was considered the research hypothesis provided guidance concerning the direction of the relationship. In considering

these personal characteristics, two phenomenon, not related to personal factors of the Congressmen, made themselves known. First political party quite often appeared to be an important control factor. Second, quite often the 83rd Congress appeared as a deviate case. These as well as other political characteristics will be considered in the next chapter.

CHAPTER IV

POLITICAL CHARACTERISTICS

The political characteristics of Congressmen are the second major group of factors to be considered. The first of these political factors to be discussed is political party.

I

The House of Representatives is organized by the political parties along party lines. This very fact would lead one to consider political party as an important political characteristic of Congressmen. The impact of party in the legislative process is one of the major themes that runs through the literature; titles such as Party and Constituency, the Congressional Party, Issues and Parties and Party, Constituency and Congressional Voting are evidence that generally party has been seen as an interesting and important factor in the study of legislative behavior.

"Knowing a Congressman's or Senator's political party affiliation is the best single guide to explain his roll-call

votes."¹ Turner agrees with this assessment stating "The factor of party, furthermore, appears to be much more influential than other pressures on Congress."²

It is generally conceded that party is an important factor in the House of Representatives. When we get to the specific issue at hand there is little guidance as to what to expect and what guidance there is turns out to be contradictory. Grassmuck found that neither party took a consistent position.³ Huntington, on the other hand, reports that from 1946-1960 the Democrats favored a higher level of military effort than did the Republicans.⁴ The contradictory findings and lack of research on exactly the same issue area create difficulty in formulating a research hypothesis. The position taken by Huntington will be accepted because it concerns a more recent time period.

The research hypothesis concerning the impact of party is as follows:

¹Louis A. Froman, Jr., "The Importance of Individuality in Voting in Congress," Journal of Politics, XXV (May 1963), p. 324.

²Turner, Party and Constituency, p. 33.

³George Grassmuck, Sectional Biases in Congress on Foreign Policy (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1951), pp. 33, 97.

⁴Huntington, The Common Defense, p. 252.

B-1 Democrats will tend to provide a higher level of support for national security programs than will Republicans.

Table 4.1 presents the basic information concerning the impact of party on national security support.

TABLE 4.1

PARTY AND NATIONAL SECURITY SUPPORT

National Security Support	81st Cong.		83rd Cong.		89th Cong.	
	Dem.	Rep.	Dem.	Rep.	Dem.	Rep.
Low ^b	73 ^a	18	30	95	52	4
High	16	76	63	3	28	92
Total Cases	228	133	127	206	267	134

^aData are presented in column percent and may not total 100 percent due to rounding and omission of middle level support.

^bLow support includes the two lowest support levels, high support includes the two highest support levels.

The relationship that emerges between party and support level for each of the three Congresses is quite clear; this is especially true for the 89th and 81st Congresses with the Republicans providing a high level of support and the Democrats providing low level support. On the basis of the entire table, not reproduced here, the index of predictive association, lambda, sub B (λ_B), for the 89th Congress is .3857 and for the 81st Congress is

.4942.⁵ For the 83rd Congress party also had a strong impact but in the opposite direction with almost all of the Republicans being low supporters and less than one-third of the Democrats being low supporters. For the 83rd Congress the λB is .6299. While party does have an important impact in all three Congresses, it is not consistent.

When the southern⁶ Congressmen are considered for the 83rd and 89th Congresses (this cannot be done for the 81st Congress due to a total lack of Southern Republicans) a basic alteration in the influence of party takes place. Table 4.2 displays the impact of party on Southern Congressmen.

The Southern Democrats in the 89th Congress have a remarkably different support pattern than the Democrats generally. While 89th Congress Democrats tend to cluster in the low support category, just the opposite is true for the Southern Democrats, they are grouped in the high support category. The Southern Republicans are clustered in the high support category much like the Republicans generally. For the 89th Congress, region is an important factor that does have an impact on the Democrats but little impact on the

⁵William L. Hays, Statistics for Psychologists (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963), pp. 606-10.

⁶See Appendix I for states classified as southern.

TABLE 4.2
 PARTY AND NATIONAL SECURITY SUPPORT
 FOR SOUTHERN CONGRESSMEN

Nat. Security Support	83rd Cong.		89th Cong.	
	Dem.	Rep.	Dem.	Rep.
Low ^b	43 ^a	100	19	0
High	52	0	69	100
Total Cases	70	4	68	13

^aData are in form of column percentage and may not total 100 percent due to rounding and omission of middle support level.

^bLow support is two lowest support levels, high support is two highest support levels.

Republicans. For this issue area there is greater similarity between Southern Democrats and Southern Republicans, or for that matter Republicans generally than between Southern Democrats and Democrats generally. This conclusion must be made remembering there were only 13 Southern Republicans. Consideration of the 83rd Congress does not result in the general reversal of the general pattern for this Congress. There is a small change in the size of the high and low support clusters, and there is a slight tendency for Southern Democrats to become more like Republicans but they are still more like Democrats generally than

Republicans. This control had little effect for the 83rd Congress.

Two other controls affected the impact of party on support levels for the 89th Congress; the data was not available for the 81st and 83rd Congresses to test the impact of these controls. The first of these controls is the educational level of the Congressman's district. The impact of this control is reported in Table 4.3.

TABLE 4.3

PARTY AND NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY, CONTROLLED FOR
EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF THE DISTRICT

Nat. Security Support	89th Congress			
	High Education		Low Education	
	Dem.	Rep.	Dem.	Rep.
Low ^b	69 ^a	15	37	0
High	5	83	47	100
Total Cases	19	35	99	19

^aData are in column percentages and may not total 100 percent due to rounding and omission of middle support level.

^bLow support is the two lowest levels of support, high support is the two highest levels of support.

This constituency factor affects both Democrats and Republicans in much the same way it affected the relationship between support levels and the size of the Congress-

man's present home town. Both Democrats and Republicans from highly educated districts tend to have lower support scores than do Democrats and Republicans in general. This is particularly true for the Democrats who show a 23 percent drop in high support when those from highly educated districts are compared to Democrats in general. There is also an increase in the Democrats with low support scores but it is not as great as the drop in high support. When the Congressmen from low education districts are considered, there is a tendency to have high support scores. Both Democrats and Republicans show a drop in the percentage who are low supporters and an increase in high supporters. The greatest percentage change again is in the Democratic column with a 19 percent increase in high supporters and a 15 percent decrease in low supporters. Conclusions about the impact of this variable must be very tentative because of the small number of cases we are dealing with in some instances and the fact only one Congress is considered. The educational level of the district does affect the support levels of both Democrats and Republicans in the same direction. The impact of this factor while felt in both parties appears to be greater on the Democrats.

A final control that resulted in anticipated but minor changes in support level was another constituency variable that was only available for the 89th Congress, the

percentage of the Congressman's districts adult male work force on active duty in the military. The results of this control are reported in Table 4.4

TABLE 4.4

PARTY AND NATIONAL SECURITY SUPPORT
CONTROLLED FOR MILITARY WORK FORCE

Impact of Military Work Force

Nat. Security Support	Low ^a		High	
	Dem.	Rep.	Dem.	Rep.
Low ^c	58 ^b	1	44	0
High	23	96	40	100
Total Cases	135	77	25	9

^aLow is less than 1 percent of the work force on active duty, high is over 10 percent of the work force on active duty.

^bData are in column percentages, and may not total 100 percent due to rounding and omission of middle support level.

^cLow is the two lowest support levels, high is the two highest support levels.

When we control for this characteristic, it again appears that the Democrats are the most affected. This is particularly true of Democrats from districts that have a high percentage of the work force on active duty; that is there is a tendency for Congressmen from this type of district to be strong supporters. The converse is also true,

that is Congressmen from districts with a low percentage of the work force on active duty tend to have lower support scores. The original hypothesis must be rejected; while it held for the 83rd Congress, it did not hold for the 81st and 89th Congresses. Grossmuck's position that neither party has a consistent record would seem to be born out of the findings for the three Congresses studied.

II

The 83rd Congress has frequently differed from the 81st and 89th Congresses in the analysis up to this point. We will now consider a factor that may account for this phenomenon. The factor to be considered is control of government. Previous studies of Congressional voting have suggested that to some degree the voting is influenced by the majority-minority status of the party in the chamber and which party controls the Presidency.⁷ In the Congresses being considered the 83rd is the exception in the area of control of government. The 83rd Congress was elected in 1952 along with President Eisenhower, the 83rd House of Representatives had a Republican majority of 221

⁷See MacRae, Dimensions of Congressional Voting, pp. 299-313; Truman, The Congressional Party, pp. 11-12, 289-317; and Grossmuck, Sectional Biases, p. 91.

to 213 Democrats. This House of Representatives is the only one being studied that was controlled by the Republican party. The 81st Congress was elected in 1948 with President Truman and the Democrats controlled the House 263 to 171 for the Republicans. The 89th Congress was elected in 1964 with President Johnson; the Democrats controlled the 89th House 295 to 140 for the Republicans. In all three cases the Senate was controlled by the same party that controlled the House.

When party is thought of as an "in" party being the party that controls government and the "out" party being the minority a different pattern emerges as reported in Table 4.5

TABLE 4.5

CONTROL OF GOVERNMENT AND NATIONAL SECURITY SUPPORT

National Security Support	81st		83rd		89th	
	In	Out	In	Out	In	Out
Low ^b	73 ^a	19	95	30	52	4
High	16	76	3	63	28	92
Total Cases	228	183	206	127	267	134

^aData are in column percent and may not total 100 due to rounding and omission of middle support level.

^bLow support includes the two lowest support levels, high support includes the two highest support levels.

The relationships that emerge from this table are much clearer than when just party was considered. In all three Congresses the "in" party has a majority of its members in the low support category and a majority of the out party fell into the high support category.

This is a rather surprising finding at first glance given the President's traditional role as leader in this issue area in particular and leader of the party in general. Parties have found it useful to support the executive when they control the executive branch.⁸ In addition to support of the President's program, Truman found a "functional interdependence" between the majority leader in Congress and a President of the same party.⁹ On the basis of these findings the following research hypothesis will be used.

B-2 Members of the President's party will tend to provide a higher level of support than will members of the other party.

In only one instance was the President on record as being on the "Pro" side of any given vote in the House. This one instance is when President Eisenhower favored S16 to compel witnesses to testify before the internal security investigating committee. In all other instances the Presi-

⁸Turner, Party and Constituency, p. 42.

⁹Truman, The Congressional Party, p. 317.

dent was either an "anti" position or there was no announced Presidential position. Frequently when there was no public Presidential position, the issue in the House was in the form of an amendment to some piece of legislation. Given the functional interdependence reported by Truman it is plausible that in many instances the bill reported out of committee in the first place was not only the one supported by the leadership but also the one the President wanted and attempts to change the bill on the floor would be opposed by the President. Because the President does not vote in the House of Representatives he cannot be assigned any scale position; however, on the basis of the foregoing discussion it would appear that in all three Congresses the President would be given a low scale score if it were possible to do this. Referring to Table 4.5 it becomes clear that the "in" party tends to be grouped in the low support category because they are following the President's lead. The "out" parties high support scores can be seen, in part at least, as opposition to the President's program. The hypothesis concerning support of the President's national security program by his fellow party members cannot be accepted.

III

The Committees of the House of Representatives are where much of the work of the chamber is done; "Congress in session is Congress on public exhibition, while Congress in its committee-rooms is Congress at work."¹⁰ This being the case the committee assignment of any Congressman is an important part of his political life and environment. Committee membership may affect the position of a congressman on various issues upon which he must vote.¹¹ Members of various committees may become advocates of various positions on issues as a result of service on committees which deal with legislation relevant to those issues. The charge has been made that members of the military affairs committee may develop a vested interest in the expansion of the armed forces,¹² and the corresponding appropriations sub-committee is made up of military enthusiasts not experts.¹³ There is some question whether service on relevant committees creates this phenomenon or whether the recruitment

¹⁰Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government (New York: Meridian Books, 1956), p. 69.

¹¹Fenno, The Power of the Purse, p. 181.

¹²Swambly, "The Growing Power of the Military," p. 25.

¹³Blanshard, "Pork Barrels in the Pentagon," p. 633.

process creates this situation. It is known that House members who have outstanding experience in international relations or extensive service in the armed services tend to be chosen for the Foreign Affairs, and armed services committees respectively; both of these committees would be concerned with some aspects of national security policy.¹⁴ This points out a problem that must be faced in the analysis. The House of Representatives, or for that matter Congress as a whole is not organized to deal with our security problems in a comprehensive manner. The committee structure is not designed to secure a broad balanced approach to the problem of national security.¹⁵ This creates a problem for analysis because there is no one committee on which we would expect to find the strong supporters clustered; there is no single committee that deals exclusively with national security issues, the job is shared by various committees and sub-committees. Committees may deal with legislation that affects the nation's security but they also deal with other non-related matters.

¹⁴Nicholas A. Masters, "Committee Assignment in the House of Representatives," The American Political Science Review, LV (June 1961), p. 365.

¹⁵Research and Policy Committee of the Committee for Economic Development. "A Statement on National Policy" reproduced under title "Civilian Control of Militarism?" U. S. News and World Report, XXVII (December 23, 1949), p. 38.

While keeping this problem in mind, the following research hypothesis will be used:

B-3 Congressmen who serve on committees which deal with national security matters will tend to provide a higher level of support for national security programs than will Congressmen who do not serve on Committees that deal with national security programs.

The data concerning selected committees is presented in Table 4.6. In dealing with this presentation one must remember that a small number of members on any one committee creates a small data base.

TABLE 4.6

COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP AND NATIONAL SECURITY
SUPPORT (Selected Committee)

Nat. Security Support Committee	81st		83rd		89th	
	Low ^a	High	Low	High	Low	High
Foreign Affairs	82 ^b	9	75	25	56	30
Armed Services	54	43	79	14	20	67
Interstate and Foreign Commerce	72	16	71	30	25	55
Education and Labor	52	41	72	31	63	31
Un-American Activity	40	40	74	24	12	88
Veterans Affairs	50	45	66	34	10	70

^aLow support level is the two lowest levels of support; high support level is the two highest levels of support.

^bData are in row percentages for each Congress and may not total to 100 due to rounding and omission of middle support level.

The most striking aspect of this table is the lack of consistently high support for any committee. No committee has more members in the high support category than in the low support category for all three Congresses. This is not the case, however, when low level support is considered. Members of two committees, Foreign Affairs and Education and Labor, consistently cluster in the low support category. Given the findings concerning the influence of Congressmen's previous occupation, this finding for the Education and Labor committee is not particularly surprising. The Foreign Affairs committee's consistent low support level is to a certain degree unexpected. This may reflect committee unity in protecting the integrity of legislation reported out or it could reflect a different approach to protecting our nation's security. The low support scores for these two committees may be a function of socialization or recruitment or both but it is persistent over the Congresses studied. Controlling for party sheds some additional light on the impact of committee membership; this control is reported in Table 4.7.

The 83rd Congress provides the clearest example of party influence with the Republicans consistently clustered in the low support category. Even though there are no exceptions for either party, the distribution for the Democrats is not as one sided as it is for the Repub-

TABLE 4.7

COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP AND NATIONAL SECURITY SUPPORT
CONTROLLED FOR PARTY (Selected Committees)

Nat. Security Support <u>Committee</u>	81st Cong.				83rd Cong.			
	Dem.		Rep.		Dem.		Rep.	
	Low ^a	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High
Foreign Affairs	100 ^b	--	60	20	37	62	100	--
Armed Services	77	24	11	78	37	42	94	6
Interstate and Foreign Com- merce	87	7	50	40	24	74	94	6
Education and Labor	90	10	--	86	20	80	94	6
Un-American Activity	50	25	--	100	33	66	100	--
Veterans Affairs	75	18	--	100	34	67	100	--

^aLow support level is the two lowest support levels, high support level is the two highest support levels.

^bData are in row percentages for each party in each Congress; they may not total to 100 due to rounding and omission of middle support category.

TABLE 4.7 (Cont'd.)

COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP AND NATIONAL SECURITY SUPPORT
CONTROLLED FOR PARTY (Selected Committees)

National Security Support <u>Committee</u>	89th Cong.			
	Dem.		Rep.	
	<u>Low</u>	<u>High</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>High</u>
Foreign Affairs	68	20	27	55
Armed Services	29	50	--	100
Interstate and Foreign Commerce	47	28	--	100
Education and Labor	85	5	11	89
Un-American Activity	25	75	--	100
Veterans Affairs	17	67	--	100

licans. This suggests that the party is more influential for the Republicans than Democrats in the 83rd Congress. In the 81st Congress, without exception, more Democrats are in the low support category than in the high support category. Generally the Republicans tend to be in the high support category; but there are two exceptions, the Interstate and Foreign Commerce and Foreign Affairs Committees. On these two committees, there are more Republicans in the low support category than the high support category. The party influence was insufficient to bring a majority of the Republican members of these two Committees into the general Republican position. For the 81st Congress the Democratic party had a greater impact on its members than did the Republican party. In the 89th Congress the Republicans have more supporters in the high support column than the low support column. While there are no exceptions it should be noted that the Foreign Affairs Committee Republicans have the smallest percentage of high supporters and the largest percentage of low supporters of any committee. On the Democratic side, the general tendency is to provide low support levels but there are three exceptions, the Armed Services Committee, the Veterans Affairs Committee and the UnAmerican Activities Committee. For the 89th Congress, the Republican in-

fluence appears to be more important than the Democratic influence.

There were several exceptions to the general patterns for the Parties in each of the Congresses. The exceptions were all for committees that are at least partially concerned with national security issues. For the 89th Congress on the Republican side the members of the Foreign Affairs committee while voting in the same general way as Republicans in that Congress showed by far the greatest tendency to provide low support on national security issues. This coupled with the fact that for the 81st Congress the Foreign Affairs Committee was a deviate case suggests that membership on that committee, for whatever reason, does tend to be associated with low support levels. The control for party reveals the relationship between membership on the Education and Labor Committee and low support to be a function of party and not independent of party influence. When Table 4.7 is interpreted in terms of "ins" and "outs"; the Democrats being the "ins" in the 81st and 89th Congress and the Republicans the "ins" for the 83rd Congress, neither "ins" nor "outs" have a monopoly on consistency of voting across committee. The hypothesis concerning service on related committees cannot be accepted, even though some committees did appear to influence their members voting it was not in

the expected way. It appears that committee membership may be associated with opposition but not support for national security programs.

IV

The Congressman's seniority is the final political characteristic to be considered. The exact impact increased seniority may have is not clear and the literature does not provide much guidance in this area. The exploratory hypothesis for seniority is as follows:

B-4 Congressmen with more seniority will tend to provide a higher level of support for national security programs than will Congressmen with less seniority.

There is very little relationship between national security support level and seniority for any of the three Congresses. The Tau-C correlations are .0914, .0183 and .1075 for the 81st, 83rd and 89th Congresses, respectively. Generally controls failed to have a major impact on the size of the correlation between seniority and national security support. The one exception was the 89th Congress where the educational level of the District had a definite impact on the relationship. For Congressmen from districts with a high level of education the Tau-C was +.1389 while those from districts with a low educational level the Tau-C was -.0876. This constituency characteristic does have an

impact on both the size and direction of the correlation. Why this relationship exists is not clear. The hypothesis concerning seniority cannot be accepted due to the slight relationship between the two factors.

v

The political characteristics of Congressmen were the second part of the triad of factors being investigated. Seniority and Committee membership had little impact on the national security support level of Congressmen. The political party of Congressmen is an important factor that influences his position on national security issues. The majority-minority status of the Congressman's party proved to be the most important political factor studied.

CHAPTER V

CONSTITUENCY CHARACTERISTICS

The Congressman's constituency is the third general force that may influence his vote on any given issue. The relationship between the Congressman and his constituency is very complex and intricate.¹ This complex relationship is very important to a Congressman because it is the people back home who decide the electoral fate of the Congressman. The literature does suggest that the Congressman's constituency does have an impact on his position on various issues and that it varies from issue area to issue area.² There is little direct research concerning the impact of constituency in this issue area but in the related areas of foreign policy and military affairs, there is little

¹For detailed discussion of this relationship see Duncan MacRae, Jr., "The Relation Between Roll Call Votes and Constituencies in the Massachusetts House of Representatives," American Political Science Review, XLVI (December 1952), pp. 1046-1055; Lewis Anthony Dexter, "The Representative and His District," Human Organization, XVI (1947) pp. 2-13; and Lewis A. Froman, Jr., Congressmen and Their Constituencies (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1963).

²Ibid and Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, "Constituency Influence on Congress," American Political Science Review, LVII (March 1963), pp. 45-57.

constituency concern.³ Even if there is little concern the type of constituency a Congressman represents may influence his position on various issues. There may be many different constituencies that a Congressman represents in addition to his congressional district.

I

The region of the country the Congressman is from may be considered one of his constituencies. The south is of particular interest in this case in that many authors have found that southern representatives display distinctively different voting behavior than do representatives generally on issues that are related to national security issues. For example, the south is the region most opposed to foreign aid.⁴ Huntington maintains that there is a military tradition in the south which does not exist in other parts of the country.⁵ The southern Congressmen come

³Miller, Stokes, "Constituency Influence on Congress," passim, Lewis Anthony Dexter, "Congressmen and the Making of Military Policy" in Robert L. Peabody and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., New Perspectives on the House of Representatives, 2nd ed. (Chicago: Rand McNally Co., 1969), H. Bradford Westerfield, "Congress and Closed Politics in National Security Affairs," Orbis, X (Fall 1966), p. 746.

⁴Charles O. Lerche, Jr., "Southern Congressmen," p. 324.

⁵Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 211.

to Washington with a nationalistic viewpoint.⁶ The research hypothesis concerning the importance of region is as follows:

C-1 Southern Congressmen will tend to provide a higher level of support than will Congressmen from other sections of the country.

Table 5.1 presents the basic information concerning high and low supports of national security programs in the various regions of the country.

TABLE 5.1

Support Level	81st Cong.		83rd Cong.		89th Cong.	
	Low ^a	High	Low	High	Low	High
<u>Region</u> ^b						
New England	65 ^c	35	68	27	78	18
Middle Atlantic	57	37	95	5	46	36
E. North Central	42	53	83	17	34	55
W. North Central	40	48	82	18	26	64
South	53	32	45	49	16	74
Border	72	20	30	69	32	36
Mountain	62	39	92	8	20	53
Pacific	48	40	79	21	53	37

^aLow support is the two lowest support categories, high support is the two highest support categories.

^bSee Appendix II for states included in each region.

^cThe data are in row percentages for each Congress.

⁶Lerche, "Southern Congressmen," p. 331.

The regional breakdown of national security supporters, does not reveal what would be anticipated from the hypothesis. In two of the three Congresses, the 83rd and 89th, the southern Congressmen do cluster in the high support category, but this is not the case for the 81st Congress. In the 89th Congress the south did have the highest percentage of its members in the high support category. In the 83rd Congress the south had the second highest percentage of its representatives in the high support category; the border states had the highest percentage of high supporters. The 81st Congress is the deviate case for southern representatives, they are definitely clustered in the low support category with comparatively a small percentage of their number being high level supporters. The other regions of the country provide two cases where the representatives provided a high level of support in two of the three Congresses. These two regions, East North Central and West North Central combined comprise what can roughly be called the Mid-West. In this case the 83rd Congress is the deviate case in the instance. It would appear that both Southern and Mid-Western Representatives tend to provide higher levels of support for national security programs than do Congressmen from other regions of the country.

When region is controlled for party as is done in Table 5.2 the original distribution becomes a little clearer.

While Democrats and Republicans do not consistently provide high or low support, when Table 5.2 is interpreted in terms of "ins" and "outs" there is a consistency. In all three Congresses in all regions there is a tendency for the "out" party to provide high support. There are two exceptions, both of which are in the 83rd Congress. The Democrats from Mountain states and the West North Central states have a majority of their Representatives in the low support category. The "in" party for all regions and for all three Congresses tends to provide low support. The two exceptions to this tendency are both in the 89th Congress and the Democratic column. Mountain States and Southern Democrats but particularly the Southern Democrats tend to fall into the high support category while Democrats from all other regions tended to cluster in the low support category. For all three Congresses the Republicans were most consistent in their high or low support depending on their "in" or "out" status. All of the cases that were exceptions from the expected pattern were in the Democratic Party column. The Republican party appears to exert more influence across region than does the Democratic Party.

TABLE 5.2
 REGION AND NATIONAL SECURITY SUPPORT,
 CONTROLLED BY PARTY

Support Level	81st Cong.		83rd Cong.		Dem.		Rep.	
	Low ^a	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High
Region								
New England	100 ^c	--	43	57	--	100	93	--
Middle Atlantic	86	9	31	63	50	50	100	--
E.No. Central	90	3	5	91	--	100	95	5
W.No. Central	75	--	10	85	100	--	82	18
South	53	32	--	--	43	52	100	--
Border	80	12	--	75	4	96	100	--
Mountain	80	20	--	100	75	25	100	--
Pacific	91	9	14	64	--	100	100	--

^aLow is the two lowest support levels, high is the two highest support levels.

^bSee Appendix II for states included in each region.

^cThe data are in row percentages for each Congress and party.

TABLE 5.2 (Cont.)

REGION AND NATIONAL SECURITY SUPPORT,
CONTROLLED BY PARTY

Support Level Region ^b	89th Cong.			
	Dem.		Rep.	
	<u>Low</u>	<u>High</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>High</u>
New England	94	--	33	67
Middle Atlantic	66	8	8	89
E. No. Central	67	19	--	92
W. No. Central	53	32	--	100
South	19	69	--	100
Border	39	20	12	87
Mountain	27	36	--	100
Pacific	80	3	6	94

One of the Democratic deviate cases was for the West North Central region in the 83rd Congress, Democrats from this region provided low support while the general pattern for Democrats was to provide high support. Democrats from this region consistently provided low support regardless of the "in-out" status of the Democratic party. Two of the deviate cases are for the Mountain states, but the deviations are contradictory. For the 83rd Congress, where the Democratic pattern is to provide high support,

the Mountain state Democrats provide low support. In the 89th Congress, where the Democratic pattern is to cluster in the low support category, more Mountain state Democrats are in the high support category than the low support category. The final deviate case is the South in the 89th Congress, while the Democratic tendency for the Congress is to cluster in the low support category, the Southern Democrats are overwhelmingly in the high support category as the hypothesis suggests. When we look at the other two Congresses we do not find the south a deviate case. For the 81st Congress the Southern Democrats provide the highest level of support for Democrats from any region, but still more are found in the low support category. For the 83rd Congress the Southern Democrats have a slight tendency to provide high support but this tendency is not overwhelming as it is for the 89th Congress. The impact of Southerners on Republicans is difficult to judge due to the small number of Souther Republicans in the first two Congresses studied. For the 89th Congress, there are more Southern Republicans but since they are members of the "out" party we would expect them to be high supporters as are Republicans from other regions of the country. Southern Republicans are indeed high supporters in the 89th Congress but it is not clear if this is a result of region or party. The research hypothesis can tentatively be accepted.

While southern Congressmen do not in all cases cluster in the high support category the tendency is there consistently in the three Congresses studied.

II

A second constituency characteristic that may influence the Congressmen is the nearness of his district to the coast. Huntington reports that Congressmen from coastal areas of the country are favorably inclined toward a strong army and navy than are Congressmen from other areas.⁷ To investigate this coastal influence in the area of national security programs Huntington's position will be the basis of the following research hypothesis.

C-2 Congressmen from coastal areas will tend to provide a higher level of support than will Congressmen from inland areas.

Table 5.3 presents the basic data concerning the relationship between coastal impact and support for national security programs.

In all three Congresses there is little relationship between coastal influence and support for national security programs. For the 81st and 89th, the correlations are -.1160 and -.1155, respectively; that is the opposite of what

⁷Huntington, The Common Defense, p. 257.

TABLE 5.3

COASTAL INFLUENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY SUPPORT

Coastal Influence	81st Cong.		83rd Cong.		89th Cong.	
	Low ^a	High	Low	High	Low	High
Nat. Sec. Support						
Low ^b	50 ^c	62	76	70	31	46
High	42	28	24	25	54	39
Total Cases	186	88	166	81	191	114

^aLow coastal influence is an inland state, high coastal influence is a district on the coast.

^bLow support is the two lowest support levels, high support is the two highest levels.

^cThe data are column percentages and may not total 100 due to rounding and middle support level.

the research hypothesis leads us to expect. For the 83rd Congress the correlation is .0471, a slight positive relationship in the anticipated direction. Generally it appears that coastal influence has little impact. When we control for party, which is reported in Table 5.4, there is little change in the basic pattern.

In only one instance, Democrats in the 81st Congress, did the expected relationship emerge. In all other instances the relationship was negative, with inland Con-

TABLE 5.4

COASTAL INFLUENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY
SUPPORT CONTROLLED FOR PARTY

Coastal Influence	81st Cong.				83rd Cong.			
	Dem.		Rep.		Dem.		Rep.	
	<u>Low^a</u>	<u>High</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>High</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>High</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>High</u>
Nat. Security Support								
Low ^b	82 ^c	75	7	36	25	35	93	98
High	<u>10</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>86</u>	<u>54</u>	<u>74</u>	<u>57</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>0</u>
Total Cases	<u>106</u>	<u>59</u>	<u>80</u>	<u>28</u>	<u>43</u>	<u>35</u>	<u>123</u>	<u>46</u>

^aLow coastal influence is an inland state, high coastal influence is a district on the coast.

^bLow support is the two lowest support levels, high support is the two highest support levels.

^cThe data are in column percentages and may not total to 100 due to rounding and omission of middle support level.

TABLE 5.4 (Cont'd)

COASTAL INFLUENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY
SUPPORT CONTROLLED FOR PARTY

	89th Cong.			
	Dem.		Rep.	
	<u>Low</u>	<u>High</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>High</u>
Coastal Influence				
National Security Support				
Low ^b	53	60	0	6
High	<u>24</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>96</u>	<u>90</u>
Total Cases	<u>111</u>	<u>83</u>	<u>80</u>	<u>29</u>

gressmen being stronger supporters than coastal Congressmen. Congressmen from the south do tend to vote in the manner indicated by the hypothesis but not consistently or to any great degree. Other controls failed to create any major changes in the relationship between coastal influence and voting on national security issues. The hypothesis cannot be accepted.

III

The Congressman has yet another constituency other than his district that may influence his voting; this constituency is his state. Truman has shown that states tend

to vote together in some cases.⁸ Congressmen from states that are directly affected by national security programs should vote differently than those that are from states that are less affected. One indicator of the effect on the state is the state's rank in defense related jobs. Even though his district may not directly benefit a representative from a state which has a large number of defense related jobs may be affected because his state constituency would have a stake in national security programs. The research hypothesis concerning the impact of the state constituency is as follows:

C-3 Congressmen from states that rank high in defense related jobs will tend to provide a higher level of support for national security programs than will Congressmen from states that rank low in defense related jobs.

The basic relationship between national security support and the Congressman's state's rank in defense related jobs for the 83rd and 89th Congresses (the data is not available for the 81st Congress) is presented in Table 5.5.

From the hypothesis we would expect that Congressmen from states that rank high in defense related jobs would also rank high in national security support. An examination of Table 5.5 reveals that this is not the case.

⁸Truman, The Congressional Party, pp. 249-269.

TABLE 5.5
STATES RANK IN DEFENSE RELATED JOBS AND
NATIONAL SECURITY SUPPORT

State Rank	83rd Cong.		89th Cong.	
	<u>Low^a</u>	<u>High</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>High</u>
Nat. Sec. Support				
Low ^b	72 ^c	76	37	38
High	<u>28</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>47</u>	<u>48</u>
Total Cases	<u>67</u>	<u>204</u>	<u>73</u>	<u>273</u>

^aLow ranking states are in the bottom two-fifths of the states, high ranking states are in the upper two-fifths of the state.

^bLow support is the two lowest support levels, high support is the two highest support levels.

^cData are column percentages and may not total 100 due to rounding and omission of middle support level.

There is apparently little relationship between the Congressman's state's rank in defense related jobs and his national security support position. The Tau-C's for the 83rd and 89th Congresses are -0767 and -0304. For these two Congresses we get a slight correlation in the wrong direction; that is they are negative, not in the direction predicted by the hypothesis. Controlling for political party makes little difference. When the control for pre-

vious military service is imposed in this instance we find that in both Congresses these Congressmen that have the least identification have higher negative correlations than do those that have a higher military identification, see Figure 5-A for this data. The impact of military identification is very similar for both Congresses. It may be that regardless of party or time, higher military identifiers are more aware of the defense related jobs in their state and are more influenced by this impact than are low identifiers.

Figure 5-A

A State Rank in Jobs and National Security Support
Controlled for Military Identifiers

	<u>No</u> <u>Service</u>	<u>Enlisted</u> <u>Man</u>	<u>Reserve</u> <u>Officer</u>
Congress			
83rd	-.1812	-.0840	.0671
89th	<u>-.1815</u>	<u>-.0457</u>	<u>.1057</u>

Controlling for coastal influence, which is reported in Figure 5-B results in a similar pattern for the two Congresses. For the 83rd Congress, there is a very slight correlation between the states rank in jobs and the coastal Congressman's support level, while inland Congressmen have a low negative correlation similar to the over all correla-

tion for the Congress as a whole. For the 89th Congress we find the same relationship exists; there is a positive correlation between the states' ranks in defense related jobs and national security support for coastal Congressmen and a negative correlation for inland Congressmen. A plausible explanation for this consistency is that when the impact of coastal influence and state rank in jobs both are present they operate in the same direction and create the positive relation that neither one independently creates.

Figure 5-B

State Rank in Jobs and National Security Support
Controlled for Coastal Influence

	<u>Coastal District</u>	<u>Inland State District</u>
Congress		
83rd	.0320	-.1287
89th	.0704	-.0462

The hypothesis concerning the relationship between the states' defense related jobs and national security support must be rejected. There is a slight relationship generally and this is negative. Only for Congressmen with high military identification or with a high coastal impact

on their districts was the correlation in the anticipated direction. Other controls failed to have any consistent impact on the relationship. When defense related procurement was considered rather than defense related jobs the same general results were obtained; this is to be expected since these two indicators are closely related, these results are not reported due to the similarity to the results that are reported.

IV

The urban-rural nature of the constituency, in this case the Congressman's district, may also influence the Congressman's position on national security issues. Havens found that urbanization was significant on half the roll-calls he studied and that it was more important than section of the country or the economic nature of the district.⁹ He generally concluded the urbanness of a district does make a difference.¹⁰ Turner reported the same general results that metropolitan rural pressures did influence voting on a good many roll-calls.¹¹ The urban nature of

⁹Havens, "Metropolitan Areas and Congress," p. 766.

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 765-767.

¹¹Turner, Party and Constituency, p. 75.

the constituency was important enough an influence that representatives of the same kind of district tended to vote alike regardless of party.¹² While there is agreement that the urban-rural nature of the constituency may have an impact on the representatives voting there is little direct guidance in the area of national security programs. There is evidence in a related area, foreign policy, that representatives from urban districts tend to be more international than representatives from rural districts.¹³ This is not the same issue area but it provided guidance in formulating the following exploratory research hypothesis.

C-4 Congressmen representing urban districts will tend to provide lower levels of support than will Congressmen from non-urban districts.

In dealing with the impact of urbanity, data is incomplete for the 83rd Congress. Only the data for whole county districts was available for this and other district characteristics. For districts in which the data concerning urbanity was not available, an estimate was made for the approximate degree of urbanity for the district. While there is no way to insure the estimates were correct, cor-

¹²Ibid., p. 87.

¹³Rieselbach, The Roots of Isolationism, pp. 114-120.

relations using only the data given and those data including the estimates were similar. The data including the estimates will be discussed. The basic relationship between urbanity and national security support is presented in Table 5.6.

TABLE 5.6
URBANITY AND NATIONAL SECURITY SUPPORT

Urbanity Nat. Security Support	83rd Cong.		89th Cong.	
	<u>Low^a</u>	<u>High</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>High</u>
Low ^b	55 ^c	77	16	61
High	45	20	70	31
Total Cases	108	176	159	150

^aLow urbanity category is the least urban two-fifths of the congressional district, high urbanity is the most urban two-fifths of the congressional district. The Census Bureau definition of an urban area is used in all cases.

^bLow support is the two lowest support levels, high support is the two highest support levels.

^cThe data are column percentages and may not total to 100 due to rounding and omission of middle support level.

The degree of urbanity of a district apparently does have a definite impact on the representative's national security support position and the impact is in the antitipated direction. The correlations also bear out the same relationship displayed in Table 5.6; for the 83rd Congress the correlation is $-.1818$, for the 89th Congress it is $-.3657$. Not only is the impact in the anticipated direction but for the 89th Congress the correlation is high. The urbanness of the Congressman's district has more impact than the two somewhat related personal characteristics that were discussed earlier; size of the Congressman's birthplace and size of the Congressman's present home town. The respective correlations for the 83rd and 89th Congresses, respectively, are $-.0363$, $-.2873$, $-.0293$ and $-.2591$. For these related indicators, as well as urbanness of the district, the relationship is negative, that is as urbanism increases as support for national security programs decreases. The impact of urbanness is much greater in the 89th than it is in the 83rd Congress. This may well be a reflection of the increase in importance of urban areas and urban problems in the time between the two Congresses. Controls failed to change the direction of the relationship. There were fluctuations in the size of the correlation but it remained negative regardless of the controls

imposed; especially interesting is the impact of the party control reported in Figure 5-C.

Figure 5-C

Urbanity and National Security Support
Controlled for Party

	Dem.	Rep.
83rd Congress	-.0256	-.1902
89th Congress	-.4010	-.2292

The Democrats show the greatest fluctuation between the 83rd and 89th Congresses while the Republicans correlation between urbanity and national security support is fairly similar for the two Congresses. For both Congresses the "in" party has a higher correlation than the "out" party; apparently increased urbanness and control of the government exert pressure in the same direction. Democrats appear to be especially influenced by this combination of factors.

The research hypothesis concerning the impact of urbanness on national security support can be accepted. The more urban a Congressman's district, the greater the tendency he will provide a low level of support for national security programs. The reverse also holds. The more rural a Congressman's district, the greater the tendency

for the Congressman to provide a high level of support for national security programs. The correlation between ruralness and national security support for the 83rd and 89th Congresses, respectively is .0154 and .3674. This is the logical but not the necessary relationship given the negative correlation between support level and urbanness.

V

Congressmen represent districts that are very different in terms of their social-economic composition. These differences in social-economic make-up of the district have been shown to be related to the representatives' voting record.¹⁴ Differences in these social-economic composition of the district have been shown to be related to party unity scores,¹⁵ support for liberal legislation¹⁶ and internationalist voting on foreign policy issues.¹⁷ While social-economic variables have been shown

¹⁴See Froman, Congressmen and their Constituencies; MacRae, The Relation Between Roll Call Votes; Jack R. Van Der Slik, "Roll Call Voting in the House of Representatives of the 88th Congress: Constituency Characteristics and Party Affiliation," Public Affairs Bulletin II, No. 3 Summer 1969 (Public Affairs Research Bureau, Southern Illinois University) and W. Wayne Shannon, Party, Constituency and Congressional Voting (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1968).

¹⁵MacRae, The Relation Between Roll Call Votes, p. 1051.

¹⁶Froman, Congressmen and Their Constituencies, p. 83.

¹⁷Rieselbach, The Roots of Isolationism, pp. 127-139.

to be related to the above mentioned positions or issue areas, this does not give direct guidance on how social-economic characteristics of a district may affect voting on national security issues. The following exploratory research hypothesis will be adopted:

C-4 Congressmen who represent districts which rank low in social-economic status characteristics will tend to provide a higher level of support than Congressmen who represent districts which rank higher in these characteristics.

There is no single indicator of social-economic status of an area that is accepted as best or even better than others. This is probably due, in part at least, to a lack of agreement concerning what is being measured. Several measures will be used as indicators of the social-economic status of the district; these are owner occupied housing, educational level and type of work force in the district. These measures are available for the 89th Congress only, since all three Congresses could not be included in the analysis, the conclusion must be considered more tentative than those based on more data.

The first indicator of the social-economic status of the Congressional district is home ownership, or more precisely owner occupied dwelling units. The more constituents who live in their own homes, the higher the social-economic status of the district. Based on the hypothesis,

we would expect a clustering of low supporters from districts which rank high in home ownership and high supporters to be from districts which rank low in home ownership. Table 5.7 presents the data for their relationship.

TABLE 5.7
OWNER OCCUPIED HOUSING AND NATIONAL
SECURITY SUPPORT

Rank in Owner Occupied Housing	89th Congress	
	<u>Low^a</u>	<u>High</u>
National Security Support		
Low ^b	46 ^c	31
High	<u>42</u>	<u>56</u>
Total Cases	158	168

^aLow owner occupied is made up of the lowest two-fifths of the Congressional district in this measure, high owner occupied is made up of the highest two-fifths of this district in this measure.

^bLow support is the two lowest support levels, high support is the two highest support levels.

^cThe data are in column percentages and may not total 100 due to rounding and omission of middle support levels.

The expected relationship failed to materialize, instead a low level tendency for Congressmen from high

owner-occupied districts to be high supporters of national security programs emerges. The correlation is .1193, a positive relationship rather than negative as would be expected. Controls did not make a major impact on the size of the correlation and in all cases it remained positive.

The second constituency characteristic used as an indicator of the district's social-economic status is the median years of school completed. The higher the social-economic district the lower the Congressman's national security support level if the hypothesis is correct.

Table 5.8 deals with this relationship.

There is a slight tendency in the expected direction, Congressmen from highly educated districts tend to be low supporters and those Congressmen from lowly educated districts tend to be high supporters. The correlation between educational level and national security support level is also in the anticipated direction a $-.0720$. When controls are imposed the relationship becomes somewhat less clear. The correlations vary considerably when controls are imposed and in some instances the correlations became positive. For example, the correlation for the south is $-.1833$ while for the mid-west the correlation is $.0692$; overall it seems that while the educational level of the district does result in the expected relationship it is not particularly strong or persistent.

TABLE 5.8
 EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF DISTRICT AND
 NATIONAL SECURITY SUPPORT

Educational Level	<u>Low^a</u>	<u>High</u>
National Security Support		
Low ^b	30 ^c	39
High	<u>57</u>	<u>48</u>
Total Cases	104	110

^aLow educational level is a district mean of less than 9.0 years of school completed, high is more than 11.0 years of school completed in a district mean.

^bLow support is the two lowest support levels, high support is the two highest support levels.

^cData is column percentages and may not total to 100 due to rounding and omission of middle support level.

The third and final indicator of the social-economic status of the district is the nature of the work force, in this case the indicator is the relative size of the white collar work force in the district. Those districts with a higher proportion of their work force in white collar jobs would be higher in social-economic status and on the basis of the hypothesis should have Congressmen who have a lower national security support level. Table 5.9 partially bears out this expectation.

TABLE 5.9

WHITE COLLAR JOBS AND NATIONAL SECURITY SUPPORT

Proportion of White Collar Jobs National Security Support	<u>Low^a High</u>	
	Low ^b	26 ^c
High	<u>60</u>	<u>41</u>
Total Cases	171	157

^aLow is bottom two-fifths of congressional districts, high is top two-fifths of the congressional districts.

^bLow support is the two lowest support levels, high support is the two highest support levels.

^cThe data are in column percentages and may not total 100 due to rounding and omission of middle support levels.

The expectation is only half fulfilled, in districts with a large proportion of the work force in white collar occupations there is no difference. For districts with a small proportion of the work force in white collar occupations, more than twice as many representatives fall in the high support category than the low support which is what is expected. The correlation is $-.1604$, also in the anticipated direction. Controls fail to change the direction of the relationship, and in many instances make little difference in the magnitude of the correlation.

The hypothesis is not clearly supported by the indicators used. Owner occupied housing and white collar jobs appear to be influential but they tend to operate in different directions. Owner occupied housing results in a positive correlation while white collar work force gives the anticipated negative correlation. The third indicator, educational level of the district produced an ambiguous picture due to the impact of controls. On the basis of this contradictory evidence, the hypothesis cannot be accepted.

VI

The Congressman's district may be directly affected by military procurement and in this way have an economic interest in national security programs. It would be quite natural for Congressmen to support programs which depend on supplies provided by industries that are located in their district and have an economic impact in the district.¹⁸ This is consistent with findings in the field of agriculture policy in which economic interest of the district was an important and effective factor in determining a Congressman's voting.¹⁹ The economic importance of military

¹⁸Huntington, The Common Defense, p. 389.

¹⁹J. Roland Pennock, "Party and Constituency in Post War Agricultural Price-Support Legislation," Journal of Politics, XVIII (May 1956), p. 209.

procurement in a district could have a definite impact on the Congressman's voting on national security issues. The research hypothesis concerning the impact of procurement is as follows:

C-5 Congressmen with many defense related industries in their district will tend to provide a higher level of support for national security programs than will Congressmen with few defense related industries in their district.

In this case the number of defense related industrial plants is a crude indicator of economic impact in a district. Due to security requirements, many different products being produced in a plant and fluctuations in procurement, the number of defense related industrial plants is one of the few indicators of economic impact available. Table 5.10 presents the basic data concerning national security support and defense related industries in Congressional districts.

The relationship is not that which we expected to find, those representatives from districts that have no defense related industries are higher supporters of national security programs than are Congressmen who have more than three defense related industries in their district. The correlation between the number of defense related industries in a district and national security support scale position is $-.1691$. Controls result in no important

TABLE 5.10
 DEFENSE INDUSTRIES IN DISTRICT AND
 NATIONAL SECURITY SUPPORT

Defense Industries National Security Support	<u>None</u>	<u>Four or More</u>
Low ^a	29 ^b	50
High	<u>54</u>	<u>37</u>
Total Cases	166	91

^aLow support is the two lowest support levels, high support is the two highest support levels.

^bThe data are in column percentages that may not total 100 due to rounding and omission of middle support levels.

change in the relationship with one exception. Congressmen from districts with a low educational level have a correlation of $-.2716$ while those from districts with a high educational level have a correlation of $.0849$. This is the only instance in which controls reversed the basic negative correlation. A possible explanation of this positive relationship is that better educated constituents exert pressure on their Congressmen to vote more "rationally": that is to vote the district in instances where the district economy may be affected in a rather indirect manner. The difference in the impact of defense related

industries on Democrats and Republicans was very small.

The hypothesis cannot be accepted on the basis of the data. As has been mentioned the indicator used was rather crude which may be one reason for the unexpected negative correlation. Another, possibly more important explanation, is that districts that have a large number of defense related plants are industrial districts and as such have a diversified economic base therefore they are not as dependent on defense related work for their economic well being. Districts that have a small number of defense related plants are less industrial and more dependent on a few defense related industries.

VII

The Congressman's district may also be directly affected economically by the presence of military bases. Several authors maintain that Congressmen who represent districts that contain many military bases are more prone to be favorable to the military than are Congressmen who do not have bases in their district.²⁰ While military issues and national security issues are not identical it

²⁰Pilisuk, "Is there a Military Industrial Complex," pp. 85-86; Huntington, The Common Defense, p. 388; and Raymond, "Growing Threat of our Military Industrial Complex," passim.

may well be that the presence of military installations in a Congressman's district influences his position on national security issues. Using the number of bases in a district presents many of the same problems of using the number of defense related industries as an indicator of their impact in a district. To overcome these problems the percent of the male work force on active military duty in a district will be used as the indicator of military impact in a district. The research hypothesis is as follows:

C-6 Congressmen with a high military impact in their district will tend to provide a higher level of support for national security programs than will Congressmen who represent districts with low military impact.

Referring to Table 5.11 there is a tendency for this relationship to exist. This is especially true for Congressmen from districts with a high military impact. When those with a low impact are considered there is not the expected clustering in the low support category, but when both high and low impact categories are considered, there does appear to be a tendency in the anticipated direction. The correlation between the two variables is .0175, very slight in the anticipated direction.

Controlling for party, the Democrats with a correlation of .1177 are more affected than the Republicans. Not only are the Democrats more affected but a $-.0810$ cor-

TABLE 5.11
 DISTRICT MILITARY IMPACT AND
 NATIONAL SECURITY SUPPORT

Military Impact	<u>Low^a</u>	<u>High</u>
National Security Support		
Low ^b	37 ^c	24
High	<u>50</u>	<u>43</u>
Total Cases	216	77

^aLow impact is less than 1 percent of the work force on active duty, high impact is more than 55 percent of the work force on active duty.

^bLow support is the two lowest support levels, high support is the two highest support levels.

^cThe data are in column percentages and may not total to 100 due to rounding and omission of middle support level.

relation for the Republicans indicates that the Republicans tend to provide lower support as the military impact increases. This is opposite the Democratic tendency and the tendency indicated in the hypothesis. This difference between parties did not exist when defense related industries in the district were being considered. This difference is difficult to explain. It may be that the Democrats have a greater direct impact in their districts because they were

in power at the time and had been in power for most of the preceding thirty years and for this reason have a disproportionate share of the high impact districts. This appears to be a distinct possibility; of the 77 high impact districts 18 were represented by Republicans and 59^f by Democrats. Controlling for coastal impact also resulted in a major change in the correlation. Congressmen from inland states have a correlation of .0349 while those from coastal areas have a correlation of .1575. This is what one would expect from the literature and much of the popular writing on the subject. The hypothesis cannot be accepted due to the negative correlation for the Republicans even though the general correlation is in the anticipated direction.

VIII

Various constituency characteristics do have an impact on the Representatives national security support level. The urban-rural nature of a district influences the Congressman's position on these issues; Representatives from more urban constituencies tend to provide lower level support than do Representatives from more rural areas. Region also has an impact, especially for southern Democrats who tend to be high supporters. Congressmen from

districts which have a high military impact are not especially affected with the exception of Congressmen from coastal districts who tend to provide higher level of support than other Congressmen. The states rank in defense related jobs does not consistently affect the representatives support position on national security issues, the exceptions are representatives from coastal areas and those who are high military identifiers who tend to be high supporters. Defense related industry in the district correlates negatively with the representatives national security support level. Finally, there is no consistent relationship between the district's social-economic status and the representatives national security support level.

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Congress does have a role to play in the area of national security. This role tends to be subordinate to the President but nevertheless there is a tradition of Congressional involvement. The power to declare war is one example of the important role given to Congress by the Constitution. In our early history national security policy and military policy were practically synonymous; since the Second World War the concept of national security has been expanded to include many other factors; military assistance, internal security and cold war issues. With the expansion of the concept of national security and an increased American international involvement Congress has become more involved with national security issues.

The particular roll-call votes studied in the House of Representatives on issues related to national security form a scalar pattern in the three Congresses being investigated and form an analytic as well as substantive issue area. The scale position of the individual Congressman formed the basic dependent variable for the study. This national security support position was studied in relation

to various personnel, political and constituency characteristics that are associated with each Congressman. In addition to percentage distribution, two statistics, Tau and Lambda, were used in the analysis of the data. These two statistics were chosen because of their appropriateness to the ordinal and nominal level of the data. The data was obtained from several official and unofficial sources, this data provided indicators of Congressmen's personal, political and constituency characteristics. The literature on congressional voting suggests several relationships that we would expect to find between the Congressman's voting and the various personal, political and constituency characteristics of the Congressmen.

This research design made it possible to investigate one important aspect of this broad area of Congress and national security policy. In research designs of this type certain problems are encountered. In some instances the data available was not as useful as it might be; this was especially true in dealing with Census Bureau data. A prime example of this problem is the definition of an urban place used by the Census Bureau, any place with 2,500 or more inhabitants.¹ This is a definition of an urban place

¹U.S. Bureau of the Census, Congressional District Data Book (Districts of the 88th Congress--a statistical abstract supplement.) U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1963, p. xvii.

but it may be that a better one could be used for social research.

In dealing with constituency characteristics and their relationship to a Congressman's position on any given issue we face a linkage problem. The constituency opinion is present but it may not be expressed by the representative for one reason or another. There is no way to be sure that the Congressman is aware of his constituency's position or interests on a given question. The amount of communication between a Congressman and his constituents may vary greatly from Congressman to Congressman. The role a Congressman plays in regard to his constituency also varies greatly. These factors contribute to the linkage problem; in that constituencies with the same demographic profile may have Congressmen who take different positions on the issues.

Several important conclusions may be drawn from this study. First, there is a general urban-rural factor that is constantly present. The more rural Congressmen tend to be stronger supporters of national security programs; this is true with various indicators of ruralness; size of the Congressman's birthplace, size of his present home town and the urban-rural nature of his district. This is consistent with the various research hypotheses dealing with the urban-rural dimension as well as other related

research.² This relationship is stronger as the rural factor comes closer to the Congressman. Representatives who live in small towns have a greater tendency to be high supporters than those who were born in small towns but now live in large cities. With the increasing urbanization of the United States, this relationship becomes more important. If this relationship continues, we should set an increase in the number of low supporters in the House of Representatives and ultimately a different type of national security policy.

A second important finding concerns the military identification of individual Representatives; specifically their personal experience in the military. The literature suggests that Representatives with a higher level of military identification should have a higher level of support for national security programs than will Representatives with a low level of military identification.³ The research did not support this contention. In all three Congresses

²Havens, "Metropolitan Areas and Congress," pp. 765-67; Turner, Party and Constituency, p. 75. See also the very important contribution of Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," American Political Science Review, LVII, No. 1 (March), pp. 45-57. This article explores the linkage problem.

³Truman, The Government Process, pp. 262-88; Huntington, The Common Defense, p. 389; and Raymond, "The Growing Threat of our Military Industrial Complex," p. 61.

studied, the relationship was slight; negative for the 83rd Congress and positive for the other two Congresses. This relationship was not expected and has important implications, for it throws some conventional wisdom into question, in that membership or identification with relevant groups is not associated with a high support level. In addition, this finding is relevant to the current debate concerning the reserve status of Congressmen and effect of reserve membership on a Congressman's impartiality in dealing with issues that are related to the military.

A third important finding concerns the impact of political party affiliation and national security support. The literature provides differing positions on this question of party influence. Grassmuck reports that neither party took a consistent position⁴ while Huntington found that Democrats favored a higher level of military effort than did Republicans.⁵ First, the research findings support Grassmuck's position that neither party takes a consistent position in the area of national security policy. In the 81st and 89th Congress, the Democrats tend to be low supporters while the Republicans tend to be high support-

⁴Grassmuck, Sectional Biases in Congress on Foreign Policy, pp. 33, 97.

⁵Huntington, The Common Defense, p. 252.

ers; for the 83rd, the opposite is true. An inconsistent pattern as Grassmuck reports. When this data is re-analyzed in terms of control of the government, consistency does emerge. The party that controls government, Congress and the Presidency, consistently tends to provide low support while the "out" party tends to cluster in the high support areas. The consistency that does emerge is related to the parties position in government and may be a result of the political climate or strategy of the "outs" versus "ins".

A fourth important finding relates to service on committees in the House of Representatives. While no single committee deals with national security matters comprehensively and exclusively, several committees do deal with various aspects of national security policy. Various authors maintain that members of committees are strong supporters of matters handled by that committee.⁶ Even though no one committee deals with national security programs exclusively, on the basis of the literature one would expect committees which deal with national security issues to be composed of members who were high supporters of national security programs. This is not the case. No committee had

⁶Fenno, The Power of the Purse, p. 181; Swamley, "The Growing Power of the Military," p. 25; and Huntington, The Common Defense, p. 122.

a majority of its members in the high support category for all three Congresses investigated. Two committees had a majority of their members in the low support column: Foreign Affairs and Education and Labor. This is particularly surprising in the case of the Foreign Affairs Committee because it could be considered a committee which dealt with questions which were relevant to national security issues and should be composed of high supporters. What this finding may suggest is that the Foreign Affairs Committee is a relevant committee but they consistently take a different approach to the question of how to provide for the nation's security.

A fifth important finding concerns the impact of region. Several authors have suggested that the region of the country a representative is from will affect his position on issues; specifically that southern Congressmen will be stronger supporters of national security programs than are Congressmen from other sections of the country.⁷ The data again is inconsistent for the three Congresses studied, but the southern representatives do tend to fall in the high support category in the 83rd and 89th Congresses. The Midwest (E. N. Central and W. N. Central) also has

⁷Lerche, "Southern Congressmen and the New Isolationism," p. 333 and Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 211.

tendencies toward high support levels. The south is not as different from the rest of the country in this issue area as some of the literature would suggest. Regional differences do exist but no region consistently returned a majority of Congressmen who were high supporters.

A sixth important finding is related to the Congressman's district. It was hypothesized, on the basis of other work,⁸ that Congressmen who represent districts with a high level of direct military impact will tend to be high national security supporters. The data does not support this position. The correlation was in the anticipated direction but it was slight and by no means conclusive. Controlling for party did have an impact on the relationship; the Democratic representatives from high impact districts are more strongly associated with high support levels than are Republicans from similar districts. While the Democratic positive correlation is higher than the basic correlation, the Republican correlation reverses and becomes negative. This party difference is important especially when there are great shifts in the party balance in the House of Representatives from one Congress to another.

⁸Pilisuk, "Is there a Military Industrial Complex," pp. 85-86; Huntington, The Common Defense, p. 388; and Raymond, "Growing Threat of our Military Industrial Complex," passim.

A seventh finding concerns the impact of the age of the Congressman. It was hypothesized that older representatives would provide a higher level of support for national security programs than would younger representatives. This was not the case; in the 81st and 89th Congresses the relationship exists in the hypothesized direction, but in the 83rd Congress the relationship is not in the anticipated direction. There is a party impact in this instance. For all three Congresses, the anticipated relationship emerged for the Republican representatives. When the Democrats are considered, just the opposite is true; there is a negative relationship in all three Congresses.

By investigating the various hypotheses, many of which were based directly on other work done in this issue area or other related issue areas, a deeper understanding of the relationship between the variables considered and national security voting was developed. Perhaps the most striking point is the complexity of the relationships at any given time or over a period of time. Much of the writing and discussion in this area has been over-simplified and does not stand up under investigation. This is particularly true in areas related to military influence but is also true when other factors such as age or region are being considered. The national security issue is very complex and emotion laden topic at this time. This study has

investigated some important aspects of the relationship between Congressional voting on national security issues and various personal, political and constituency characteristics associated with Congressmen.

The importance of this problem necessitates further research in this area. This research should be undertaken employing other types of analysis such as multiple classification analysis, multi-dimensional scaling or factor analysis. In addition to the different modes of analysis, it may be profitable to investigate Congresses in which the same party does not control both the Presidency and both houses of Congress.

The issue of national security policy has become a very important part of the debate over our nation's priorities. This debate is taking place in and out of Government, and the subject and how it is dealt with will continue to be a subject of research. It is hoped the present study has provided a start toward a deeper understanding of this complex problem and will provide a foundation for future research in this area.

APPENDIX I

Indicators of Variables
(non self explanatory)

VARIABLE	INDICATOR
Party	Democrat Republican Other
Education	No high school Some high school High school graduate Some college Junior college, business school No college degree and law school College degree College degree and law school College degree and graduate school
Religion	Protestant Catholic Jewish Other None
Intensity of Religious Preference	Preference Preference stated in official biography Member of religious organization Local or state officer in religious organization National officer in religious organization
Military Identification	No military service Enlisted man Officer

Military Identification (Cont'd)	Member of veterans organization Officer of veterans organization Member of reserves
Occupation	High level business Physician or dentist Lawyer Educator, Clergy, social worker Medium level business Engineer, architect other technical professions Government service Military Farmer Skilled or semi-skilled labor Housewife Retired
Rank on Committee	Chairman Ranking minority member Second man to chairman Second man to ranking minority member Top half but not top two Bottom half
Size of Birthplace	Less than 10,000 persons 10,000 - 49,999 50,000 - 199,999 200,000 - 499,999 500,000 +
Size of Present Home Town	Less than 10,000 persons 10,000 - 49,999 50,000 - 199,999 200,000 - 499,999 500,000 +
Region	<u>New England</u> Connecticut Maine Massachusetts New Hampshire Rhode Island Vermont

Region (Cont'd)

Middle Atlantic
Delaware
New Jersey
New York
Pennsylvania
E. North Central
Illinois
Indiana
Michigan
Ohio
Wisconsin
West North Central
Iowa
Kansas
Minnesota
Missouri
Nebraska
North Dakota
South Dakota
Solid South
Alabama
Arkansas
Florida
Georgia
Louisiana
Mississippi
North Carolina
South Carolina
Texas
Virginia
Border States
Kentucky
Maryland
Oklahoma
Tennessee
Washington, D. C.
West Virginia
Mountain States
Arizona
Colorado
Idaho
Montana
Nevada
New Mexico
Utah
Wyoming

Region (Cont'd)	<u>Pacific States</u> California Oregon Washington
	<u>External States</u> Alaska Hawaii
Coastal significance	none State on coast but not district District on coast
Seniority	First elected less than three years before start of Congress First elected more than three but less than ten years before start of Congress First elected more than ten but less than eigh- teen years before start of Congress First elected more than eighteen but less than twenty-six years before start of Congress First elected more than twenty-six but less than thirty-five years before start of Congress First elected more than thirty-four but less than forty-two years be- fore start of Congress First elected more than forty-two years but less than fifty years before start of Congress

APPENDIX II

Scales
81st Congress

<u>ROLL CALL NUMBER</u>	<u>SES- SION</u>	<u>PRO VOTE</u>	<u>PERCENT PRO</u>	<u>CONTENT</u>
189	1	Y	66.1	Furnish military aid to foreign nations HR5895
6	2	N	50.1	Economic aid to Korea HR5330
124	2	Y	40.5	Recommit foreign economic aid with instructions to cut 25 million in tech- nical aid HR7797
295	2	N	38.6	Emergency relief to Yugoslavia HR9853

83rd Congress

135	2	Y	84	Campbell witnesses to testify before inter- nal security investi- gating committee S16
106	1	Y	55.4	Create special com- mittee to investigate philanthropic founda- tions unAmerican activities H.Res. 217

<u>ROLL CALL NUMBER</u>	<u>SES- SION</u>	<u>PRO VOTE</u>	<u>PERCENT PRO</u>	<u>CONTENT</u>
117	2	Y	42	Prevent sharing of atomic information with allies HR9757
118	2	N	40	Exchange informa- tion on peacetime use atomic energy HR9757
69	1	Y	31	Disapprove Reorgan- ization Plan No. 6 Strengthen civilian control H.Res. 295
89th Congress				
23	1	N	85.1	Recommit funds for unAmerican activities committee and hold hearings to justify funds requested H.Res. 188
373	2	Y	57.9	Prevent Export- Import bank from guaranteeing credit to Communist coun- tries for purchase of U. S. goods HR18381
293	2	Y	50.4	Recommit foreign assistance appro- priation with in- structions to cut economic aid by 10% HR17788
109	1	Y	44.8	Cut 130 million from development loan fund HR7750

<u>ROLL CALL NUMBER</u>	<u>SES- SION</u>	<u>PRO VOTE</u>	<u>PERCENT PRO</u>	<u>CONTENT</u>
134	2	Y	43.9	Restrict role of agricultural pro- ducts to Communist countries HR14924
261	2	N	44	Foreign aid act HR15750
79	1	N	22.6	Increase U.S. con- tribution to Inter- national Monetary Fund HR6469

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